


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NOVEMBER 1988

A SOVIET WEEKLY
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

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highlight of the week

U.S.S.R. - India

Leonid Abramov

and Sergei Irodov

THE NOAH'S ARK CALLED

THE EARTH

Quotations

Pakistan

Vladimir Kulistikov

INTER BENAZIR



Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Delhi became a new important landmark in Soviet-Indian cooperation. The visit was timed to coincide with the closing ceremonies of the twelvemonth U.S.S.R. festival in India

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
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Anatoly Chebotarev

DEBUT IN SEOUL



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INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVE

From the editors: We are launching a new rubric on our Glasnost pages and inviting readers and representatives of public and government organizations to contribute to it. Issues 42, 45 and 47 carried drafts of international measures which, if implemented, could promote citizen diplomacy and contacts between citizens of the Soviet Union, the United States, France and other countries. We have received comments on these drafts and new proposals and have decided to hold a review of initiatives advanced by popular diplomats. It should be said right away that we promise to support all these ideas but reserve the right to participate in only one of them, the most interesting, in our view.

We look forward to new letters and proposals.

Vladimir Khrenov,
Chairman of the Cooperative Vira
Moscow

■ I and my colleagues from Vira (Russian abbreviation for introduction of inventions, rationalization and lease known abroad as ISI) have become very interested in the

plan to set up an association of Soviet and American families (issue 45). Incidentally, we are going to transform Vira into a state-cooperative association.

In our opinion, a programme of international scientific and technological cooperation, also jointly with American companies, could provide the most natural basis for implementing the above-mentioned plan. Cooperation could be established in such fields as designing and producing new consumer goods, medical instruments, and television and photographic gear. We can offer several absolutely new

proposals of tremendous significance, I venture to say, for mankind's future progress.

If we provide good living conditions for specialists from the companies that cooperate with us – and this is possible to do locally – they will gladly come with their families to work under contract for protracted periods. This part of the programme could also envisage the founding of an association of families. For this purpose we think it necessary to organize a sort of House of Peace, a scientific and technical inventors' centre open to families from all countries. Believe me, this is not as fantastic a project as it might seem at first glance.

cal merits of the MiG-29 fighter were noticed at the Farnborough Air Show. They are competitive, and our country can conclude advantageous contracts. This is, indeed, an achievement we can be proud of. The demonstration of Soviet military hardware is a clear indication of glasnost and a chance to earn hard currency, the more so as all the industrial states are still selling arms.

On the other hand, the sale of arms impedes conversion from military to civilian production and means indirect support for the countries involved in regional conflicts. But restricting arms sales does not depend solely on the Soviet Union. Our government has repeatedly put forward initiatives to limit and even ban any trade in arms. But the West has not responded to them. What remains for us to do? Halt arms deliveries to other Warsaw Treaty states or do the same thing unilaterally with regard to other countries? Of course not.

A way out of the impasse was correctly pointed out by the author of the article. It is to conclude multilateral agreements with the appropriate supervisory agencies under the aegis of the U.N. Together with the reduction of strategic weapons, this will ultimately remove the barriers on the way to conversion from military to civilian production.

It is, however, inappropriate to compare our manoeuvrable fighters with domestic refrigerators and clothes.

OPINIONS

Kurt Dobereksky
Gera, G.D.R.

■ My personal experience in the United States from 1943 to 1946 and in Britain from 1946 to 1947 has led me to believe that the existence of two or more parties does not guarantee a democratic state. The difference between bourgeois parties lies in names and symbols and, of course, in the amount of money they possess. I closely followed the election campaign in the United States, but did not find any mention in newspapers of a working-class candidate.

I am firmly convinced that glasnost and perestroika are more necessary in the United States than in the Soviet Union. I watched mass violations of human rights in the United States with my own eyes. Perhaps I am too critical, but despite President Reagan's praise for his free country (which, incidentally, he repeated before Moscow University students), the exact meaning of the words "freedom" and "human rights" evidently escaped his notice, as the American reality testifies to the opposite.

I don't believe anything will change now, because not a single party in the United States is capable of governing the country without the agreement of banks and corporations. Only big business is a real force, and it alone determines the entire policy of the state.

V. Chebukin
Kharkov Region, U.S.S.R.

■ In issue 43 I read a rather controversial article by Rostislav Zolotarev, "Sell fridges, not MiGs." I believe that the high combat and technologi-

A MATTER AT ISSUE

Sergei Zaozersky
Archangel, U.S.S.R.

■ I wonder why in the rubric Profile Sketches, which I read with great interest, you only publish stories about our contemporaries. The veil of secrecy is now being lifted over the lives of figures in our history both good and bad. Sometimes we know much less about them than about our contemporaries. Why not expand the rubric and regularly carry stories about people whose names have been in-

scribed in the pages of history?

Marine Ardent
Nice, France

■ Please put my name under any petition in defence of Soviet soldiers taken prisoner in Afghanistan. Though a foreigner, I am deeply concerned about their fate, as many of them are of an age to be my sons.

Excuse me for the question. Can you, the Soviet people and government, say with a

GLASNOST

GLASNOST

clear conscience that you have done everything possible to secure their return? I know you have applied to official bodies for help. But that is not enough. I think "parallel" actions are often needed, such as discussions and an exchange of prisoners of war. When it was necessary to free our hostages in Lebanon we held talks not with those who had captured them, but with "agents." This is an instance from our history. And in your case Pakistan is involved.

I think you should also raise a fund to ransom your captured soldiers. It would, I believe, be a highly effective means of aid. In Pakistan, too, there doubtless are people ready to meet you halfway.

Statement by the Public Commission for International Cooperation on Humanitarian Issues and Human Rights attached to the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation

■ On November 16 last year Haydar Kutlu, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Turkey, and Nihat Sargin, General Secretary of the Turkish Workers' Party, were unlawfully arrested by security bodies at Ankara Airport on their return home from exile to start the legal activity of the United Communist Party of Turkey.

Up to the start of their trial on June 8 this year, the two political leaders had been subjected to unlawful coercion and their rights as political prisoners had been restricted without any grounds. In the opinion of noted lawyers from different countries, the charges brought against them have a purely political, not a legal, character. These innocent, courageous people, patriotic citizens of their country, are threatened with life imprisonment; and this at a time when high-level statements are being made in Turkey to the effect that the Communist

Party should play its part in the country's democratic political system.

World opinion calls for the early release of Nihat Sargin and Haydar Kutlu, who must be allowed to conduct legal political activity without obstruction. Such a call has been made by the European Parliament, many Communist and Workers' parties, Social Democrats, Socialists, Greens, Centrists, Liberals, national liberation movements, and public organizations.

The members and activists of the Public Commission for International Cooperation on Humanitarian Issues and Human Rights wholeheartedly join this call and, on the anniversary of the imprisonment of the two Turkish Communists, urge the Turkish authorities – whose representatives signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights nearly forty years ago and later acceded to such universally recognized documents as the European Convention on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act – to abandon the tactic of delaying the trial, revise the punishment meted out to Haydar Kutlu and Nihat Sar-

gin, and immediately release them.


We are deeply convinced that the continued detention of these political leaders, whose "guilt" consists in upholding the principles of democracy, will not contribute to the noble cause of humanizing international relations, building a "common European home," increasing and expanding international cooperation on human rights, and promoting democracy the world over. At the same time, the humane act of releasing them would mean yet another success for the policy of new thinking in our nuclear and space age.

On behalf of the Public Commission:

FYODOR BURLATSKY, chairman of the commission, political analyst, Literaturnaya Gazeta;
Metropolitan JUVENALY of Krutizy and Kolomna;
VLADIMIR DUDINTSEV, writer;
DANIIL GRANIN, writer;
IRINA ANTONOVA, director of the Pushkin Fine Arts Museum;
LYDIA NOVAK, chairman of

the Central Committee of the Medical Workers' Union;
VITALY IGNATENKO, editor-in-chief of New Times;
BORIS RAUSHENBAKH, academician;
VICTOR PROTASOV, associate of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, winner of the Lenin and State prizes;
VENIAMIN YAKOVLEV, director of the national research institute of Soviet legislation.

AN ARTIST'S COMMENT



HIGHLIGHT OF THE WEEK



**STENY
H. HOYER,**
Chairman, U.S.
Congressional
Committee on
Security and
Cooperation
in Europe

I thought our meetings at the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet most fruitful and interesting. We touched upon a wide range of issues associated with human rights in the Soviet Union. I think there are significant changes occurring in your country which we believe to be positive in that respect and hopefully they will pave the way to broader understanding between our two countries. I also think that will lead to enhanced performance with reference to human rights issues and to the revision of those provisions of Soviet legislation which your own leaders have criticized as not having been consistent with international norms and practices in the human rights sphere. Hopefully there will be an improvement and that will go a long way towards better relations between our two nations and thereby enhance our security and cooperation which, of course, is our common objective.



**DUSAN
POPOVSKI,**
President
of the Federal
Assembly of
Yugoslavia

I think we shall highlight our national holiday of Republic Day on November 29 with so crucial a development as the adoption of Constitutional amendments, which is expected to take place on November 25.

These amendments, which are only part of the reforms we are to carry out in Yugoslavia, will pave the way towards initiating an economic reform whose objective is to restore the laws of socialist commodity production through distribution according to the work done.

I must say that the coordination of these amendments was far from being plain sailing, inasmuch as the principles on which our Federation operates necessitate taking into account the attitudes of all our republics and provinces with respect to any constitutional amendment. In turn, that means that when we sought acceptable solutions we had to engage in discussions to ensure the equality of each republic and autonomous province. We highlighted problems of common interest and evolved commonly acceptable solutions.

Though this time we didn't tackle the fundamentals of our Constitution, at a later stage we will probably engage in drafting a more consistent, succinct and explicit constitution. However, we shall on no account query our basic values and achievements such as socialist self-government, non-alignment and the equality of our national ethnic units.

When we undertake to draft our new Constitution, we will subject our mistakes to analysis and hopefully evolve new solutions. We shall find useful in this respect an exchange of experience with the other socialist countries, more specifically a study of perestroika in the Soviet Union. Although perestroika and our own reforms differ somewhat, they do not conflict, as our common goal is to build socialism with a human face.

The reason I visited Teheran recently was the need to discuss the substance of current Soviet-Iranian relations in the new context of the cease-fire in the protracted Iran-Iraq war, as well as to exchange views on regional problems of major relevance.

During our two days of packed talks, we discovered considerable as yet untapped potential for promoting good-neighbourly relations between our two countries, especially in the sphere of commercial and economic cooperation. We hope to achieve progress at the forthcoming eleventh session of the bilateral commission on economic affairs in December.

Besides exclusively bilateral relations, we also focussed on problems relating to an Afghan settlement. It is an open secret that mujahideen groupings of the so-called "alliance of eight" are operating from Iran. We said we were convinced that Iran too could utilize its available options to contribute to normalizing the situation in and around Afghanistan. Although we still do not see eye to eye, we heard each other out and hopefully correctly assessed the nuances in the approaches. Consultations over Afghanistan in which both sides have a stake continue.

Understandably, our discussions on international issues centred on aspects of a political settlement between Iran and Iraq, for which U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 has furnished the groundwork. The important thing now is for the bilateral negotiations between Iran and Iraq to be an ongoing process. True, the situation is by no means simple, with the truce still fragile; hence fortitude and common sense are called for. We stressed the importance of the role played by the U.N. Secretary-General and said that we back his efforts.

The impression is that Teheran is considering further development and wondering how to slot into the framework of relationships with other countries in the way most rational and sensible from the angle of its own national interests. Hence I believe we can expect a more intensive and varied diplomatic effort from Iran.



**ALEXANDER
BESS-
MERTNYKH,**
First Deputy
U.S.S.R.
Minister
of Foreign
Affairs

The Noah's Ark called the Earth

Cooperation, confidence, better partnership – the fundamentals of the latest Soviet-Indian summit

Mikhail Gorbachev's official friendly visit to India dovetailed with the start of the celebrations for the centenary of Jawaharlal Nehru's birth in Delhi and elsewhere in the country. This was symbolic and not just because Nehru, as independent India's first Prime Minister, initiated the friendship and cooperation between our two countries. The name of this illustrious politician and philosopher is rightly linked with the entrenchment in international affairs of the ideas of peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and the humanitarian principles that derive from the time-honoured Indian teaching of Ahimsa, or non-violence. These principles were asserted during the troubled 1950s and 1960s, when confrontation between many states was taken for granted.

Jawaharlal Nehru's contribution to the ideas reflected in the Pancha Shila and the concept of non-alignment is currently being noted at public gatherings as well as at scholarly conferences and symposia in India, where the emphasis is placed on their organic integration, some twenty-odd years after Nehru's death, in the Delhi Declaration on Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon-Free and Non-Violent World signed two years ago by the Soviet and Indian leaders. Nor is it any wonder that, speaking at the close of the U.S.S.R. Festival in India, Mikhail Gorbachev stressed that the Soviet people would join with the Indian people in honouring Nehru's memory.

Currently, men and women in many different countries and of widely different mentalities are looking to Indian philosophy. Though they may disagree with its principles more often than not they seek to extract its rational kernel that may be of use in contemporary historical and social conditions. We are learning from the Indians how to listen to what the other side has to say, to understand the



Mikhail Gorbachev and Rajiv Gandhi talking tête-à-tête

TASS photo

opposite point of view in order to achieve a joint solution, and to respect our opponent's principles and stance. In his "Autobiography," Nehru indicates his attitude to Mahatma Gandhi when they differed on certain points: "A vast distance seems to separate him from me. With a stab of pain I felt that the chords of allegiance that had bound me to him for many years had snapped. For long a mental tussle had been going on within me. I had not understood or appreciated much that Gandhiji had done... I held clear and definite views about many matters which were opposed to his... I fought many a battle within myself when I felt that I was being dragged away from the anchor of my spiritual faith. Somehow I managed to compromise." Forged in the philosophical collisions between Gandhi, the father of the Indian nation, and Nehru, the builder of the new India, were the postulates that subsequently came to underpin India's foreign policy. Nehru ex-

pressed their essence well when he said that he thought the attitude and philosophy inherited from Asoka, Gandhi and the other great thinkers and rulers, the "live-and-let-live" philosophy of tolerance and coexistence, offered the sole practical solution to the problems of today.

Confirmation of this is provided by the Soviet-Indian summit statement which asserts that the Delhi Declaration incorporates the fundamentals of the

philosophy of survival and progress in this nuclear-space age, exercising a positive impact on the world's overall political climate and simulating the reshaping of international relationships.

Many issues answered

The latest Soviet-Indian summit is over. The speeches made in Delhi and the documents signed answer many questions and outline the solutions to many bilateral and international issues.

Rumours as to a change of priorities in Soviet foreign policy, an alleged cooling towards India were dismissed at the outset, inasmuch as these and similar arguments were frequently aired in some Indian media on the eve of the summit. Mikhail Gorbachev said they were not worth discussing, as they were of a clearly speculative order and entirely

groundless. He issued the reminder that the relations between the two countries were rooted in a similarity, if not, at times, coincidence of attitudes towards the contents and aims of world development. He added that these relations derived from unqualified reciprocal respect for each nation's social and political choice. Rajiv Gandhi expanded on the picture of bilateral relationship by commenting that it benefited millions and harmed no one.

The unbiased observer will find it hard to contest the point that confidence and a consistent desire to refrain from anything that could jeopardize each other's interests are inherent in the Soviet-Indian relationship. This derives not only from the strict observance of the principles of sovereignty and equality, the contents of the 1971 Soviet-Indian treaty, and the principles of the Delhi Declaration, however great their significance. It stems from the age-old tradition of good relations between the two peoples.

In the course of the private meetings between the two leaders, which accounted for about nine hours of the 48 that Mikhail Gorbachev spent in India, the two sides said they sought further to consolidate bilateral relations. Running like a red thread through the talks and the final document is the point that Soviet-Indian ties are integral to the world process.

The basic provisions of the final Soviet-Indian summit document which the Indian press has singled out are:

- the contemporary interdependent world is the common home of the human race, and every single person is equally entitled to its resources;

- it is essential to promote the building of a universal system of international security by pooling the efforts of all states;

- the new approach to international relationships, as set out in the Delhi Declaration, calls for new doctrines, policies and mechanisms to bring into being and safeguard a nuclear-free, non-violent world. Both the Soviet programme for the complete phasing out of nuclear weapons by the year 2000 and the Indian "plan of action" for a nuclear-free, non-violent world by the year 2010 should be taken seriously by the world community;

- the Geneva accords on Afghanistan must be faithfully and unswervingly adhered to by all parties concerned. The obstructionist policy of certain forces which violate these accords is serving to prolong the bloodshed in Af-

ghanistan and impede the national reconciliation process, the sole way to form a broadly based government and preserve the country's independence and territorial integrity.

The substance of the approach to the other key international issues noted in the final statement was most aptly characterized by Mikhail Gorbachev on receiving the Indira Gandhi Peace Prize from the Indian President Ramaswami Venkataraman. He said: "We are all aboard the Ark that is the Earth."

It was precisely from this angle that aspects of the bilateral relations so meaningful to either side were discussed. The Delhi summit will unquestionably impart a powerful boost to every kind of bilateral exchange. The agreements signed during the summit provide for Soviet assistance on several new projects in India, one of which envisages the construction of a nuclear power plant.

The U.S.S.R.'s economic restructuring and India's economic modernization have created new potentials, which the two sides believe it necessary to exploit to the full. There are many such options. One issue discussed was for Indian private businesses to participate more actively in promoting bilateral commercial and economic cooperation. Though potentially rich, Indian private companies have so far been somewhat reluctant to do business with Soviet organizations. They complain of the many rungs that have to be climbed to have decisions taken in the U.S.S.R., of the bureaucratic obstacles, and the other organizational hurdles that stand in the way of access to the Soviet market. However, Indian firms can now directly contact Soviet enterprises and open offices in the constituent republics. Furthermore the agreement signed to prevent double taxation has removed one more thing Indian businessmen found objectionable.

"Namaste!"

Though the economic aspect of interstate relations is of exceptional significance, the truth of the words that man does not live by bread alone has been reaffirmed by the year-long Indian and Soviet festivals. During the recent Soviet-Indian summit the two leaders attended the concluding events of the U.S.S.R. Festival in India.

The results of this cultural exchange of unprecedented scope and intensity have demonstrated that our two great

peoples sought to show each other as extensively as possible the treasures of their spiritual and material culture.

"It has been rightly remarked that where there is nothing, nothing will grow, but where the field is ploughed, the seed sown will sprout," Kedar Nath Singh, a prominent Indian politician who is one of the general secretaries of the ruling Indian National Congress (I) Party, told us. "The festivals' seeds have brought forth a wonderful harvest. The two festivals offered a unique opportunity for broad direct contact between Indian and Soviet people, an informal and mutually interesting dialogue.

"Our people," he continued, "like the Soviet people very much, and if the issue is one of what can be done to strengthen understanding and friendship between us and to preserve peace on earth, no outlay on the mutual spiritual enrichment of our peoples can be considered too great."

Indeed, the two festivals integrated well with the political side of the bilateral relationship. Socio-cultural and political links between any two countries practically always maintain an identical level, as in communicating vessels. Should political confidence waver, the intensity of exchanges and contacts in other fields immediately straightens out the situation. Conversely, when there are no real feelings of friendship and affection between peoples, substantive progress is unlikely to be made in the political arena. Festivals of this nature inject into world politics that humanitarianism that was absent in the past.

"In Hindi 'namaste' has a twofold meaning," Mr Singh said in conclusion. "It means both 'hello' and 'goodbye.' As we say 'goodbye' to the Festival of India in the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.S.R. Festival in India we also say 'hello' to new and still broader contacts between our two peoples and to the new friendship festivals with which we are planning to mark the 20th anniversary of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between our two countries and the fifth anniversary of the Delhi Declaration in 1991. Millions in India greeted Mikhail Gorbachev with 'namaste' on a visit that will undoubtedly open up still more impressive vistas for extending our all-round cooperation and strengthening the friendship between the Indian and Soviet peoples."

*Leonid Abramov
and Sergei Irodov,*
our special correspondents

DELHI

QUOTATIONS

Robert Hawke,
Prime Minister
of Australia

■ The past year has seen indications that evoke growing, though still cautious optimism with regard to political tendencies in the Asia Pacific region. The current events in the Soviet Union are perhaps the most important of them. We should not be naive. But it remains a fact that Soviet policy in its present development gives us cause to hope for a more constructive approach on the part of the Soviet Union than we have seen till now. Soviet policy towards Asia has received a fresh impulse under Mikhail Gorbachev.

We have carefully studied the Krasnoyarsk speech of General Secretary Gorbachev and welcome the positive call for the expansion of ties between the Soviet Union and countries in the region, especially China, the recognition of South Korea and proposals for a number of measures, including joint ventures and the setting up of special economic zones in the Soviet Far East. (Retranslated from the Russian)

Bill Bradley,
Democratic Senator,
Member of the Senate
Finance Committee
of U.S. Congress

■ "The biggest challenge for new President Bush will be to seize the opportunities presented by the proposed reforms of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev. I believe the President must engage the leaders of the Western Alliance, by the time

Hey, Greeks, seen any Gorgon around? No, the very sight of our bases must have scared her off.

Drawing by Vsevolod Arsenyev

of the allied (NATO) summits next summer, in developing a strategy for economic relations with the Soviet bloc. Without such a strategy, Mr Gorbachev's dexterous diplomacy could endanger alliance cohesion and impede sensible burden sharing.

"Mr Gorbachev currently copes with an internal budget deficit that is, in relative terms, big-

ger than the U.S. budget deficit. He cannot finance that deficit through the international capital markets because the rouble isn't convertible. Moreover, without reform, the rent-up inflation and persistent shortages threaten the Soviet economy with a continued productivity crisis."

Li Peng,
Premier of the State
Council of People's
Republic of China

■ "China and the Soviet Union are neighbours. They have a common border stretching for 7,000 kilometres. The normalization of relations between our two countries will therefore be in the interests of peace

in the region. China is a developing nation engaged in the building of a socialist economy. It needs a stable and peaceful international environment. After the normalization of relations between China and the Soviet Union we shall be able, we hope, to become even better neighbours. But there will be no return to the 1950s, when the two countries were in alliance. China wants to live in harmony with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The development of Sino-Soviet relations will in no way affect China's relationship with Western countries."

Alfred Miodowicz,
Chairman of the
All-Poland Trade
Unions alliance

■ "Trade unions do not deny the possibility of going on strike. We seek to allow them to undertake protest actions on a legal basis, on behalf of employees, avoiding the former procedure of long preparations and misunderstandings that lasted for months... It is necessary to change the attitude to the workers' demands by considering them without delay and stating right away what can and what cannot be done. It is a scandal if demands are settled only when employees call attention to them by dramatic means, by suspending work. Things of this kind make people believe that only in this way can they prove their case."

Carlos Andres Perez,
Presidential Candidate
of the Party of
Democratic Action,
former President of
Venezuela

■ "The struggle against Communism in Latin America has always been a farce, because Communism has never threatened the countries in the region. Under this false slogan dictatorships have been installed and injustices committed in Latin America."

Enter Benazir

Pakistan People's Party is celebrating victory, but will democracy triumph?

The further it recedes into the past, the less dignified the era of Zia ul-Haq appears to be. After the voting on November 16 and 19, it appears to have been no more than an unsuccessful election campaign that lasted 11 years. A great deal has been said about the big margin of strength of the late general's "alliance of mosque and bazaar," but as in 1970 and 1973 the electorate voted for the Pakistan People's Party, the PPP, the party of the general's enemy.

History seems to have repeated itself. It is not clear which member of the Bhutto family actually won the election, the father or the daughter. The political mould will not be easily broken in Pakis-

tan. In the past, civilian administrations have only been able to manage a brief tenure between prolonged periods of dictatorial rule. Will Benazir do better than that, given that all the other dramatis personae are still there? The top military brass are accustomed to ruling the country. The landlords supply votes of the tenants wholly dependent on them. The ordinary people are compelled to go without the basic benefits of civilization.

Overboard

The Pakistan People's Party won 92 seats out of 217 at the National Assembly, which will enable it to control the gov-

ernment only if other factions and independent members of the Assembly back it. Its success is relative, but the defeat of the Islamic Democratic Alliance, the IDA, is total. It ended up with a mere 54 seats, but more importantly, its leaders who were aiming for the top posts failed to achieve their objectives.

Mohammad Khan Junejo mistook the elections for a referendum on his three-year term as Prime Minister. I spoke to him a day after his first public statement on his resignation. He was as excited as an actor who has unexpectedly got a big hand from the audience, and kept repeating that the people believe in him. It transpired, though, that there is a difference between the voice of the people and the rousing cheers of his election rally supporters. The former Prime Minister lost his native constituency to a People's Party newcomer.

And what about Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi so sure of himself? He was received by the President himself, left and right alike sought his backing and even the centre tried to woo him, but in the end he too lost.

BENAZIR BHUTTO is the daughter of the founder of the Pakistan People's Party, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, toppled in July 1977 by General Zia ul-Haq and executed two years later on the general's orders on a dubious charge of involvement in the assassination of a political opponent.


Benazir Bhutto, 35, was born in Larkana, Sind Province, and was educated at Harvard and Oxford Universities. In a bid to smear her and capitalize on the religious feelings of the electorate, her political opponents published photographs of her as a student wearing a T-shirt with a family planning ad.

Following the death of her father, Benazir was outspoken in her criticism of the military regime and spent a total of five years in jail or under house arrest for this. Later she was allowed to go into "voluntary" exile in Western Europe. She returned to Pakistan in 1986 to a tumultuous welcome from her numerous supporters.

Benazir Bhutto and her party built their election campaign on social development and human rights, and pledged to increase spending on health care and education. She also pledged to put an end to all forms of discrimination against women. The argument of the Islamic Fundamentalists was that according to the Koran an Islamic nation cannot be ruled by a woman. Her political adversaries claimed that she is an "opponent of Islam," and a paid agent of various nations, including the U.S.A., India and the U.S.S.R.

At the end of 1987 Benazir Bhutto married, and she gave birth to a son in September. She accused General Zia of having deliberately set the date of the elections for November to prevent her from doing her best. Health problems after the birth of her son delayed her election campaign till the very end of October, two weeks before election day.

Benazir, whose name means "peerless," is leader of the PPP, but her mother, Begum Nusrat Bhutto, is the official chairperson of the party. She was able to return to Pakistan only in September, shortly before her grandson was born.



Nawaz Sharif, chief minister of Punjab Province, did make it to the National Assembly, however. The indications are that he was helped along by an estimated two to four million rupees from public funds that he spent wooing voters, or so the independent papers say. It may also have contributed to his success that he comes from a Punjab-based family of smelting industry tycoons.

The 1988 elections gave opportunists a hard time. Voters preferred people committed to principle, whether supporters of the PPP or the late General Zia's party. Nawaz Sharif did not abandon the late general, while Junejo kept manoeuvring. At first he presented himself as a victim of Zia's. The general had treated him rather high-handedly, notifying him of his dismissal at Islamabad's international airport where Junejo landed on his return from a glamorous tour of China on May 29. Later on he cashed in on the anti-dictatorial sentiment and pledged to enter into an alliance with any party except the supporters of Zia from Fida's faction of the Pakistan Muslim League. But on election day he entered into an alliance with them.

Jatoi took an even more tortuous path. A leader of the PPP, he quarrelled with

Benazir Bhutto and founded the Pakistan National People's Party, the PNPP. He criticized General Zia and his successors, but at the same time he never took a stand on the issue of the release from prison of the Secretary-General of the PNPP Ghulam Mustafa Khar. The indications are that he wanted to hold onto the leadership of the party in the run-up to the elections in order to be able to bargain with his erstwhile opponents for cabinet posts.

Another important factor was the defeat of the retired Air Force Marshal Asghar Khan, leader of the small Tehrik-i-Ishtiqal (Solidarity) Party, which has Social Democratic leanings. When I met him in Islamabad two months ago he had just entered into an alliance with Junejo. When I asked him why he did not join forces with the PPP — after all, the platforms of the two parties were close — he replied that the "extremists," that is, the supporters of both Zia and Bhutto, did not stand a chance, they had been discredited, and voters would go for a third centrist force...

Spectre of populism

Having been to the election rallies of the various parties in Rawalpindi and

Karachi, I realized that the PPP has considerably more eloquent speakers than the parties of the right. Paradoxical as it may seem, the period of conservative dictatorial rule saw a weakening of the leading positions of the right. General Zia selected members of his government according to the extent of their readiness to do as they were told. He wanted to have his executives in his pocket. Any attempt at independent action spelt disfavour and as a result capable ministers were gradually ousted from the cabinet, while independently minded officers left the army. When the political struggle came into the open, the right found itself at the losing end.

Politologists specializing in the Third World came to the conclusion a long time ago that weakness on the part of the conservative forces is a factor that destabilizes democracy. Unable to withstand the pressure from the left, they join forces with the military and bureaucracy and resort to violent means to deal with political problems. A dictatorship does not arise of its own accord, is not built in the barracks, and before the army decides to intervene in politics it usually tries to secure covert backing from this or that civilian force.

At least this has been the case in Pakistan on many occasions in the past. Retired Lieutenant-General Fazle Haq declared that "martial law has always been imposed when the politicians made a mess of things. If they screw up again the army has every right to take appropriate action." There are forces in the country, that, having lost the democratic elections, feel certain that this is the time to act.

The conservative politicians began to taunt the military immediately after General Zia's death, but the highest-ranking military officer, Army Chief of Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, believes that the army's position has been undermined by its intervention in politics and neglect of professional duties. He has hinted on several occasions that confining the army to barracks is the only way to restore training standards. Benazir Bhutto went on record as saying during the election campaign that "the military's action in the campaign has given us confidence that they want democracy..."

The army is not the only threat to the process of democratization. By resorting to dictatorial measures General Zia helped the Pakistani public to forget the authoritarian ways of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. A convinced populist, he favoured dialogue with the people, but reacted badly to criticism of his party and did not give the trade unions and independent press more leash than he felt they deserved. It was Bhutto who began to dismantle the independent judicial system; the 1976 Constitutional Amendment, introduced while he was in power, changed the rules protecting judges from transfers without their consent.

Few people call into question the ability of his 35-year-old daughter to mobilize the masses with her emotional speeches.

The leader of the PPP on record

On the political role of the army

Zia was bent on keeping the army in politics. The retreat of the army from active politics is another contrast with the Zia years. ... We would not want to do anything to give any pretext for the armed forces to intervene."

On military spending

asked if it was possible to cut the military resources, she said, "Only if you want to invite martial law."

On Islamization

I don't think that Zia ul-Haq really meant Islam. We saw militarization instead of Islamization.

On U.S. aid

We receive so much aid, but there's nothing to show for it today in Pakistan. I can't point to projects. There's nothing to show for the Zia years.

On the Afghan problem

We stand by the commitment already made by Pakistan because we feel the Afghan conflict is in its final stages, and nothing should be done to shake it by internal changes. We want the withdrawal of all Soviet forces and a government in Kabul, which reflects the aspirations of the Afghan people and which provides stability so the refugees can return to their homes."

On relations with the Soviet Union

Good relations with the United States would not prevent us from having better relations with the Soviet Union, now that it is pulling out of Afghanistan. Its presence there aggravated our relations.

From pre-election interviews given by Benazir Bhutto

More and more people perceive her as an excellent tactician, capable of making deals with both President Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the military, as well as with the right. That a majority, albeit a relative one, has recognized a woman as being worthy of the highest government office amounts to a revolution in Islamic society, but the brief record of democracy in Pakistan shows that it won't be enough to strengthen it by bringing a party committed to democratic principles to election victory, but that the principles themselves must prevail.

Firing from both barrels

Anton Chekhov said that if there is a rifle hanging on the wall in the first act of a play it must go off in act three. To use a phrase coined by a Pakistani colleague of mine, Zia left a double-barrel on the Pakistani political scene with both barrels trained on the heart of democracy. One barrel is charged with the external debt and other economic problems, the other with an alarming foreign policy situation, and above all the Afghan problem.

According to the estimates of the Applied Economic Research Centre at Karachi University, Pakistan is in the throes of "a long-term economic crisis rooted in basic structural faults in the economy and a continuing inability to mobilize resources." The experts at the Centre have demonstrated beyond doubt that one of the principal causes of the crisis was General Zia's drive to beef up the non-productive sectors of the economy and increase defence spending and the budget of the bureaucratic machinery. The austerity policies proclaimed by the "financial wizard" of his regime, Mahbubul Haq, had practically no effect on those expenditures, but led to cuts in programmes to improve health care and wipe out illiteracy.

The problem of economic reform and the need to pay off the 14-billion-dollar debt were not election issues. Some explain this by referring to the "emotional style" of the polemics between Benazir Bhutto and Mohammad Khan Junejo. It would appear that there are other reasons for this. Any economic reforms in the country will no doubt bear on the interests of landlords and the military. Previous experience suggests that without the support of the former it is impossible to win the rural vote, while it is impossible to stay in power given opposition from the military. At any rate, Benazir Bhutto has said that she will be meeting the demand for land at the expense of government estates and that she is not thinking of cutting the military budget.

The future government is likely to run into even more trouble if it attempts to change its policy towards Afghanistan. There have been indications that the Inter-Service Intelligence of the Pakistani Army interfered in the elections in a bid to block the PPP, which is suspected of indifference to the cause of the mujahideen. Mohammad Khan Junejo fell out of the military's favour because of his insistence that Geneva Accords be complied with. So far Benazir Bhutto has given no indications as to how she intends to deal with this most complex foreign policy problem.

Vladimir Kulistikov

CYPRUS

An outburst of chauvinism

Tensions are mounting again at the "green line" which has split Cyprus in two, like a livid scar, after the tragic events of 1974

More stones, broken bottles, torn-up posters and streamers have appeared on the lifeless strip of land. Numerous groups of Greek Cypriots arrived there on November 15 and 16 to protest against the so-called "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" proclaimed five years ago. The very fact of its proclamation bid defiance to the international community. Therefore, the only country to have recognized it so far is Turkey, which occupied the north of Cyprus 14 years ago.



Turkish lookouts at the "green line"

Photo from the U.S. News and World Report

The forms of protest selected by Greek Cypriots these days can hardly be justified. Stones, bottles containing water or incendiary mixtures were hurled over the barbed-wire fence in the buffer zone. As a result, twelve students and nine soldiers of the U.N. peace-keeping force in Cyprus were wounded. Blood stained the "green line" and the gap between the two communities of the once united people of Cyprus got wider still. The turnpikes of the checkpoints, which were thrown hospitably open to the Turkish Cypriot community politicians, have snapped shut again.

Attempts to reunify the territory and people of Cyprus have been on for years. Many countries and international organi-

zations have been working to bring about a peaceful settlement. A glimmer of hope appeared last autumn when President Georgios Vasiliou and Rauf Denktas, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, set down to a negotiating table in Nicosia to resume the inter-community dialogue.

The turn the situation has taken has aroused legitimate concern among all those who really want peace to prevail in Cyprus. The Yenidüzen newspaper published in northern Cyprus points out that the actions of the Greek Cypriot thugs at

the "green line" have given the "Turkish fanatics ample evidence to the effect that Turkish and Greek Cypriots will never be able to get along." On the other hand, the paper continues, Greek Cypriot fanatics actually join hands with those in the north who do not want inter-communal rapprochement. "In this way," the Yenidüzen paper stresses, "the right-wing chauvinists among the

Greek and Turkish Cypriots have put up a united front in the way of those wishing to unite the two communities by peaceful means."

The paper calls on all those who hold dear the ideals of a united, independent federal Cypriot state resolutely to oppose chauvinist feelings in both communities and thus to pave the way for a settlement in Cyprus. Well, this reasonable appeal is worth heeding.

Mikhail Mashkov

NICOSIA

Echoes of Kristallnacht

The events that took place in the Federal Republic in November are a credit to the social forces of the country. Such words might seem odd from a man who has earned the reputation of an inveterate critic of Bonn's policies, yet I take full responsibility for them.

We all owe a measure of gratitude to Mr Philipp Jenninger, who, as the Number 2 in the F.R.G.'s political hierarchy, made on November 10, 1988, a speech devoted to the 50th anniversary of the Jewish pogroms in Nazi Germany. It was a sincere speech made without any ulterior motive. The speech – here I would like to correct some of my colleagues who reported it – neither contained a direct rehabilitation of fascism, nor extolled Nazi crimes. The speaker simply and honestly revealed the latent attitude to the Nazi past, which, though not advertised, is widespread in the Federal Republic. This attitude can be expressed in the following formula: "Of course Hitler was terrible but..." The second part of it may vary ("he restored order in the country..." "did away with unemployment..." "concluded the Munich treaty with England and France"). In substance all these variants boil down to a search for "objective" and "subjective" mitigating circumstances (who would ever have dreamed that the burning of synagogues would be followed by the Holocaust?)...

Let us be frank: we have long ignored such sentiments, preferring to look for the rudiments of neonazism. Meanwhile, the relationship between today's F.R.G. and the country's past has reached a crucial turning point. This process once affected only those who experienced Nazism themselves. Today it has extended its spell to the millions of West Germans, who "were lucky to be born later." This "luck," however, does not exempt them from the need to analyze the past.

It is here that the danger of the "simple" approach lies. The wave of conservatism that has swept the country since the Christian Democratic Union came to power has created favourable conditions for such an "approach" to Nazism. This wave has unleashed a powerful ideological offensive, which in 1986-88 gave rise to the much-talked-about "historians' debate." Those who started the debate – not neonazis of course, but respectable historians – attempted to bring scholarships to the old "but..." formula: of course Nazism was terrible, but the rise of Hitler was merely a response to the Bolshevik threat... The Wehrmacht was defending Western civilization...

It has become common to accuse the F.R.G. of not learning from the past. Fortunately, this is not the case. "The historians' debate" was followed by a nationwide public outcry. The debate was taken up not by the scholarly community alone, but by the entire country, and especially the

Lev
Bezymensky



No vaccine
against
Nazism

young, who refused to be lulled into playing down the historical guilt of fascism. Then came the Jenninger affair. Unlike the old Adenauer days, when it took months and even years to sack the openly Nazi-sympathizing minister Oberländer, the ruling party was quick to realize that a politician unable to divorce himself once and for all from the Nazi past could not continue in office as Bundestag President. Jenninger resigned only a day after his notorious speech.

However, let us not confine ourselves solely to this incident. The 50th anniversary of Kristallnacht – "the night of the pogroms" – has commanded much public attention, which is indicative of the dominant feeling in the F.R.G. and other countries. Not long ago, Bundestag deputies avoided any mention of the German people's liberation from Nazism, and the SS graves at Bitburg Military Cemetery were the scene of heart-felt eulogies. In the F.R.G. the first week of November became the week of repentance, reminding many how the tragedy **started**.

To be sure, not all speeches mentioned how the tragedy **ended**. I happened to take part in a Bonn-based international symposium where anti-fascists from 12 European countries recalled that the genocide against the Jews was for Hitler a prelude to the future annihilation of other peoples, including the Slavs. Here we can't draw any distinction, as Hitler's racist policy was to isolate Jews in ghettos, and not only in the literal sense of the word. The Nazi crematoria did not recognize national differences. Neither did the great movement of Resistance. Incidentally, Jenninger did not mention the Resistance at all, and maintained that in 1933 nobody knew "what situation would be like in 1941." But we did know. Let us remember the words of Ernest Thälmann: "Fascism is war."

Hitler's racism taught the world a lesson. At the Bonn meeting many said that of the monstrous legacy of Nazism, racism is the most tenacious part. Even in Europe, which bore most of the fascist onslaught, racist ideas and slogans are not yet extinct. Openly racist parties are planning to participate in the elections to the European Parliament scheduled to take place next year in the European Community. Socialist countries also encounter individuals infected by racism. Clearly there is no vaccine against this ideological virus. It requires constant vigilance on the part of the world public and, sometimes, the surgeon's scalpel.

The world has entered an era of historic "self-education," a time of 50th anniversaries. 50 years have passed since the signing of the Munich treaty, the beginning of the pogroms, the abortive attempts to build a united front to repel the Nazi aggression, the start of the second world war. This is a serious test for those who are willing to learn from the past. We all have to learn – the world will not survive another global catastrophe.

Past record and outline for the future

Andrei Kudryavtsev, Cand. Sc. (Econ.)

In the recent past the Soviet Union and France were called pioneers of détente, and rightly so. But in the early and mid-1980s there were long breaks and even periods of backsliding in the relations between the two countries.

The state of Soviet-French relations at that time obviously cannot be considered outside the overall international context. It is also true that the Soviet Union failed to do all it could to avert relapses into cold war. Not a few reasons for the decline in Soviet-French relations in those years lay in the way Paris shaped its foreign policy. At the same time, the Soviet Union was constantly guided by the desire to promote goodneighbourly relations with France.

Looking for a foothold

France's withdrawal from NATO's military structure in 1966 was conceived by General de Gaulle as part of his general foreign policy concept, designed to ensure the country broad independence in the world arena. The advantages Paris hoped to gain thanks to its special position in the bloc were in inverse proportion to the degree of East-West tension. The course of events in the 1960s and 1970s more than once confirmed the argument that France's security rested on its national defence and the process of détente. Hence "concord and cooperation" with Moscow were regarded as a pillar of France's independent foreign policy and a sort of counterweight to its participation in the Western alliance.

The advent to power in 1981 of a socialist government that began to carry out progressive social and economic reforms raised hopes that France's cooperation with the Soviet Union would expand steadily. But the new leadership first brought its relations with Moscow to a standstill and then curtailed them. The breaking of continuity in the policy towards the East was accompanied by rapprochement with Washington. As was said in France at the time, Paris was becoming "the most diligent pupil in the NATO class."

There is an explanation for this turn towards the Atlantic bloc. The conservative U.S. administration reacted to the Socialist government's economic re-

forms and the participation of Communists in it with an ill-disguised hostility that verged on interference in France's domestic affairs. In these circumstances, Paris decided to play up to its powerful ally in the political sphere in the hope of gaining concessions, or at least "favourable neutrality" in the economic sphere.

The Socialists came to power at a time when the winds of cold war had again started to blow across the globe. Since France had the most extensive relationship with the Soviet Union, it immediately became the main object of tough pressure on the part of Washington in its attempts to draw the allies into a policy of confrontation with the socialist countries. As France's currency situation deteriorated, Paris found itself increasingly vulnerable to such pressure. Though in some fields the leadership did not go as far as Washington was stubbornly impelling it to go, Soviet-French ties were damaged considerably. The damage would have been much greater had the Soviet Union not displayed restraint and the ability to be guided by long-term interests.

There were also deeper reasons behind the change in France's foreign policy objectives. The social experiment launched by the left quickly miscarried, and in 1983 the government's economic policy was brought into line with conservative recipes for dealing with the crisis. The change of priorities in the economic sphere impelled the Communists to drop out of the government.

As the factors that irritated Washington disappeared one after another, the internal situation in France "returned to normal." However, no marked change was brought about in foreign policy. Paris continued its attempts to introduce a spirit of ideological intolerance in interstate relations with socialist countries.

In the 1980s France was confronted with the question: how to remain a major power in the world arena? Experts warned that it would be more and more difficult for France to preserve its distinc-

tive foreign policy by relying solely on its own forces. Some pointed to France's diminishing share in the world population and others to the growing expenditure necessitated by technological progress in the civilian and military fields. Moreover, France's economic position in the group of industrial capitalist states has worsened in the past few years, as have its structural ties and competitive power in the commodity markets.

Paris concluded that reliance on the joint power of the consolidated West European centre was the best method of resolving the growing contradictions between the country's foreign policy ambitions and its real potential. (The Socialist leaders' attempts to find a counterweight to France's membership of the Western alliance in its active presence in the Third World, so-called tiersmondisme, quickly proved ineffective.)

Accelerated "Europe-building" has become the main priority of France's foreign policy while its readiness to make concessions and reach compromises has cleared the way for deeper regional integration. The idea of establishing a common European market by 1992 is today a popular slogan, a sort of "new frontier" unanimously supported by all the major political parties.

Growing costs

The desire to extend West European integration did not mean that the level of relations with the Soviet Union would inevitably decline. Nor did it run counter to France's participation in an all-European process. However, Paris hoped to secure key positions in the group, primarily with the help of military levers. The political and strategic advantages associated with membership of the nuclear club were regarded as a decisive counterbalance to the increasing asymmetry in the Bonn-Paris tandem. Hence France's tough intention by any means to retain a free hand in modernizing its nuclear missiles. Following this line, Paris first refused to have its nuclear arsenal counted in the total balance of forces of the two blocs, and then rejected the Soviet prop-



President Mitterrand being given a brass-band welcome at the entrance to the Institute of Higher Studies of National Defence where he made a speech emphasizing the intellectual and psychological aspects of disarmament.

Photo from U.S. magazine Time

People of diverse views, sceptics and optimists alike, showed genuine interest in the changes taking place in our country. They regard everything that has been done in the Soviet Union over the past three and a half years as positive. The new image of the U.S.S.R. has become a factor of political life that is impossible to ignore.

At first, Paris took an extremely cautious attitude to the package of Soviet

proposal to start a direct dialogue on the issue.

In an attempt to impart a military and political character to the integration processes, France sought to reinvigorate the Western European Union and extended its military cooperation with Bonn. It was directly stated at one time that Bonn should be linked more closely with the Western alliance and prevented from radically improving its relations with socialist countries. Finally, taking advantage of the exacerbation of the situation on the continent, Paris put greater emphasis in its military doctrine on solidarity with the allies. (It is indicative that in the mid-1970s the French leaders also tried to establish closer cooperation with NATO, but, having seen that this did not square with political détente, ultimately abandoned attempts to alter its strategic doctrine).

The "militarization" of France's European policy brought certain dividends as long as tendencies towards confrontation prevailed in the world. As soon as the political climate began to change for the better under the influence of the revised Soviet foreign policy, this "militarization" prevented French diplomacy from understanding the significance of new developments and assess it properly in good time.

Paris was the first Western capital to which Mikhail Gorbachev made an official visit in October 1985. This major event in international life broke the ice of the cold war that had begun again in the

early 1980s. The Soviet leader's call to Western Europe during his Paris visit was imbued with the spirit of new political thinking. But the impulse given to bilateral ties was not consolidated, and it can now be stated with good reason that the momentum was then lost.

Some news analysts explain this in terms of the difficulties of the two years of "cohabitation" (1986-88) between the Socialist president and the right-wing premier. Having made foreign policy an arena of rivalry between two centres of executive power, they say, this "cohabitation" increased the French leaders' preoccupation with domestic issues and hampered their diplomatic activity.

This argument is not entirely unfounded. Indeed, during the years of "cohabitation" Paris did not put forward any major foreign policy initiative, merely reaffirming its old positions. Nevertheless, the fact that recent events have outstripped France's policy towards the East can hardly be attributed solely to "cohabitation" between the two centres of executive power.

"France has fallen into the trap of an extremely ideologized approach to its relations with East European countries," *Le Monde* wrote some time ago. One cannot but agree with this conclusion. Based on old stereotypes, the ideologized approach has become increasingly divorced from the changing realities and perception of the Soviet Union by French public opinion. Recently I delivered several lectures on perestroika in France.

disarmament proposals based on the new political thinking. It feared that the businesslike discussion and, moreover, practical implementation of these proposals would make the political aspect of security more attractive in comparison with its power aspects and in this way would ruin its game in Western Europe. The architects of French political philosophy proved intellectually unprepared at that moment to treat the philosophy of a nuclear-free world seriously, regarding it as an encroachment on vital French national interests.

But some time later the INF treaty was concluded, and Soviet-American talks on a 50-per cent reduction in strategic offensive armaments began. Talks on a reduction of conventional armaments in Europe are on the agenda. These developments indicated a process in which, it seemed, Paris did not fully believe. Disarmament was becoming a practical issue.

For a long time France kept out of the disarmament process, making its participation in it dependent on numerous preconditions. The restoration of old approaches in the changing situation virtually removed Paris from the solution of key problems. As a result, the country's international prestige was damaged. Even greater political damage to France's prestige was caused by its attempts to slow down progress towards agreements. At the Geneva talks on the prohibition and abolition of chemical weapons Paris claimed for itself the right to possess

"minimum stocks" of toxic agents, and even increase them, during a ten-year transition period after the signing of the appropriate convention. Even France's allies were puzzled by claims of this kind.

In the changing world

Recently, however, there has been growing understanding in Paris that a wait-and-see policy in relation to the East runs counter to the national interest. While urging the West to remain vigilant and pay no heed to the "siren of perestroika," the authors of a report prepared by the French Institute of International Relations conclude that France's policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe "should be brought into line with changing realities, because it "is not yet equal to the current tasks."

Moreover, Paris should not mark time. The more energetic countries, such as the F.R.G. and Italy, have made their way into zones of economic and political interests that seemed to have been historically reserved for France. We have lost some of our positions and can only remember now what we had in the past, Minister of Foreign Affairs Roland Dumas admitted recently. The authors of the above-mentioned report are especially concerned over the possibility of "the centre of gravity of Bonn's foreign policy interests shifting to the East." They fear that this could endanger progress in "Europe-building."

In the new circumstances, the solution of one long-standing problem – the search for guarantees against the undesirable evolution of Bonn's foreign policy – has brought Paris to see the necessity for resuming a dialogue with the East. Finally, Paris had no part in the current easing of tension in Europe. For the first time this process gained momentum without its participation. And when you are late for a train you have to jump onto it while it is moving at full speed.

Seeking to enliven its relations with the Soviet Union, the French leadership clearly understood that it was not enough to have only a point of departure for a dialogue. It is necessary to have enough material to make the dialogue constructive and take a special place in it, in keeping with the traditions of French foreign policy.

On his reelection to the post of president, François Mitterrand declared that disarmament would be one of the main objectives of his foreign policy activity. This intention was further developed in the president's recent speeches in the United Nations and at the Institute of

Higher Studies of National Defence. François Mitterrand reaffirmed his support for the INF treaty and his opposition to the militarization of outer space. He expressed the wish that France should join the efforts for disarmament "both intellectually and psychologically."

The French proposals concerning talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe – for determining the first two-year stage of talks, eliminating the imbalances and asymmetries and setting up a central zone along the line of contact of the two blocs – have a great deal in common with the initiatives put forward by the socialist countries. Paris has substantially changed its position on the question of chemical weapons. The statement on France's readiness to give up plans to manufacture chemical weapons immediately after the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition and abolition of these weapons has opened up the way for progress in this area of disarmament.

The toughening of the competition and the uncertainty as to the place French companies will be able to take in the markets of capitalist states maintain their interest in the capacious Soviet market. Such an interest exists not only in traditional but also in technically advanced branches. Moscow and Paris understand that a large-scale development of business contacts is possible only with the establishment of active economic, scientific and technical cooperation between the two countries.

French business has shown interest in the possibility of setting up joint ventures in the Soviet Union. But on the whole French companies are biding their time, pointing to the difficulties in mastering new forms of cooperation. The Italians have got over obstacles the French for some reason considered insurmountable, *Le Monde* commented recently in this connection. There is a possibility of advancing scientific and technological cooperation and clearly determining the priority trends of its development. Bilateral scientific and technical ties are important for France in view of the Soviet Union's immense research potential. In such fields as fundamental sciences and peaceful space exploration these ties are vitally necessary for France.

However, the Franco-Soviet contribution to progress in the relationship between the West and the U.S.S.R. will clearly not be decisive either in disarma-

ment or in the sphere of trade and economic ties. Experts from the French Institute of International Relations believe that the American-Soviet dialogue will be of paramount importance in the disarmament field. As for trade and economic ties, it will be difficult for France to compete with the Federal Republic of Germany.

What remains is the rich experience of political cooperation. The Soviet Union and France were the first countries with different social systems to agree on the principles of cooperation and practise consultations on a wide range of issues. This helped to gain a better understanding of the partners' interests, which did not always coincide. Raising political cooperation to the present-day level means increasing efficiency so that the areas of mutual understanding are translated into practical cooperation between the two countries for a solution of world problems.

Considerable reserves for further dialogue are accumulating in the humanitarian sphere. It is quite possible that a qualitatively new type of mutual relations could develop here. It would become an original contribution by the two countries to the all-European process of the 1990s. So far the spirit of confrontation has prevailed in the discussion of human rights. As Soviet society gets rid of its bureaucratic crust and moves forward in the building of a law-governed socialist state, the exercise of human rights is to become a sphere of constructive cooperation between countries with different social systems. The observance of the bicentenary of the French Revolution will be a striking example, confirming that our two peoples are dedicated to the common ideals of freedom and humanism. There are good prospects for cultural exchanges, which rest on long-standing traditions, the considerable potential for the promotion of these ties, and mutual interest in them.

* * *

As regards the present state of relations between our countries, it can obviously be said that favourable conditions have arisen today for raising Soviet-French dialogue to a new level. In the Soviet Union and France there is confidence that the forthcoming meetings between their leaders will be a strong impulse capable of raising the entire complex of bilateral ties to a higher level.

A bid for statehood

The flag of the Palestinian state raised at PNC meeting in Algiers on November 15.

The ceremony took place in the conference hall of the Palace of Nations in Algiers, where the 19th meeting of the Palestine National Council, a sort of parliament in exile, adopted a declaration of independence. The national anthem of Palestine was also played.

A state that is not on the map

The birth of the state of Palestine is bound up with a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. As a result of such a settlement, Israel will have to evacuate from the West Bank, Jordan and the Gaza Strip, which it occupied in 1967. Only then will the Palestinians be able to build their national state on these territories.

This does not mean, however, that the statehood proclaimed on November 15 is a phantom wrapped in the four-colour national flag with the aim of comforting the unfortunate Palestinians and inspiring them with hope of gaining freedom and national rights. Older people remember school maps on which part of Palestine was designated as the "territory of an Arab state" to be established parallel with a Jewish state under U.N. Resolution 181 adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947. This resolution on the partition of Palestine is impossible to forget as it serves as the international legal basis for the existence of Israel. It also legitimizes the Palestinians' desire to have their own independent state. What matters, however, is not just formal legality but the power of that desire.

The uprising

The national flag was not raised in Algiers because the Palestinian leaders suddenly discovered the 40-year-old resolution in the archives, but because a popular uprising against the military oc-

cupation regime has been in progress under this flag for almost a year on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. PLO chairman Yasser Arafat could not but raise the national flag in Algiers, amid stormy applause, as young Palestinians are daily raising it at gunpoint in the occupied territories.

Now that even in Israel most people admit it to be impossible to perpetuate the denial of civil rights to the Palestinians by force of arms, and Jordan has aban-

that would balance the interests of all countries and peoples in the region and ensure their right to life and progress in conditions of peace and security.

Laying the foundation of their own state

The PNC meeting is no doubt historic event and a turning point in the life of the Palestinian people. It adopted a declaration of independence in which the Palestinian state is proclaimed as a state for all Palestinians, including those who live outside it, a peace-loving state that re-



Yasser Arafat and Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid.

Reuter photo

doned its patronage of the population of the West Bank, the Palestinians themselves have started to build their national home. Figuratively speaking, they have begun construction from the "roof," as such a method exists in modern building practice.

Builders know, however, that a foundation is indispensable. The U.N. resolution of 1947 merely gives the right to build national statehood. The foundation is impossible to lay without an international agreement on a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict, an agreement

nounces threats, violence and terror against itself and other countries.

While this declaration makes the Algiers session a historic event, another document makes it a turning point. This is the political statement reflecting the work done by the Palestinians in laying the foundation of their own state, with the ultimate purpose of convening a session of their parliament, not in Algiers or any other Arab capital, but on Palestinian soil freed from Israeli occupa-

tion as a result of the peace talks.

The significance of this seven-point document can hardly be exaggerated. The Palestinians themselves are calling it a product of their "new political thinking" based on a flexible approach that takes realities into account and departs from the old symbols and dogmas that had become a milestone to the movement. The political statement is a manifestation of the PNC's genuine responsibility before the rebellious Palestinians, and a reflection of its desire to honour the memory of the fallen fighters not only by haloing them with martyrdom, but by a real advance towards liberation.

The new document sets out a plan for a political settlement in the Middle East. Its main points agree with the universally accepted idea of how to achieve Arab-Israeli coexistence by peaceful means, through negotiations. The key element of the plan is the PLO's readiness to participate jointly and on an equal footing with the other parties involved in the conflict in an international conference on the Middle East on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and the principle of guaranteeing the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination.

This formula means the explicit recognition by the Palestinians of Israel's right to a secure existence in exchange for Tel Aviv's commitment to abide by the above-mentioned resolutions. In other words, the Palestinians are ready to negotiate with Israel at the conference, not without considerable assistance on the part of the great powers, because the aim of the conference is to achieve not a separate deal but a comprehensive and reliably guaranteed settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole. As a result of these negotiations Israel would evacuate the territories it occupied in 1967 and the Palestinians would acquire a real chance to decide their future.

On the basis of recognition by the Palestinians of the right of the two peoples – Palestinian and Jewish – to independent national statehood, the conference will elaborate conditions and guarantees for peaceful coexistence between them. The programme directly points to the Security Council's special role in drawing up measures to ensure peace and security for all parties to the conflict, including, of course, Israel and the Palestinian state.

The possibility of a Palestine-Jordan

confederation is also being envisaged. This gives the lie to the Zionist claim, promulgated for decades, that an independent Palestinian state would present a mortal danger to Israel. It should be said in this connection that the danger to Israel is represented by the

Basic points of the political statement approved by the Palestine National Council

1. Convening an international conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the U.N., on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and ensuring the Palestinian people's rights, including the right to self-determination.

2. Israel's withdrawal from all the Palestinian and Arab territories that it occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem.

3. The annulment of all annexation measures and the abolition of the settlements established in the territories occupied since 1967.

4. Placing these territories under provisional U.N. control.

5. The solution of the refugee problem on the basis of the appropriate U.N. resolutions.

6. Guarantees of freedom of religion and worship in the holy places of Palestine.

7. Security Council measures to guarantee peace and security for all countries in the region, including the state of Palestine.

despair of about five million Palestinians over their lack of national statehood.

Olive branch

The programme also reflects an understanding that Palestinian statehood is unlikely to be established hard on the heels of the evacuation of Israeli troops. A transition period is possible, with the territories freed from occupation to be placed under U.N. control

while the international conference thrashes out the final formula for peace and security in the region.

The PLO's revised objectives, approved by the Palestinian parliament, clearly show that the Palestinians appear to be responsible and realistically-minded partners at peace talks. The fallaciousness of the Israeli "argument" that the PLO is a "band of terrorists" who yield only to force of arms has become even more evident. The PLO represents the people of Palestine, and the Middle East problem is impossible to resolve without taking their wishes into account.

In his famous speech from the U.N. rostrum in November 1974, Yasser Arafat said that he held in his hands not only a rifle but also an olive branch, and that he would not drop it, come what may. The Palestinians who have now risen against the occupation regime do not even have rifles, only stones. Their strength lies chiefly in their earnest desire to win peace and freedom on their land. This desire has helped the Palestinians to acquire the inner strength and moral prestige which have made the olive branch the PLO's chief weapon.

The decisions adopted by the PNC at its Algiers meeting have opened up new possibilities for increased efforts in preparing for an international conference on the Middle East. This is admitted even by those circles in the United States who, following Israel, still refuse to allow the legitimate Palestinian representatives to take part in the peace process. The realism displayed by the Palestinians in formulating their national objectives can and must be used to the utmost to create an atmosphere of general intolerance of the obstructionist and, I would even say, anti-national line of the Israeli rulers, who would rather turn the Israelis into a nation of warders and gendarmes than work to achieving peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians and their other Arab neighbours.

The Soviet Union highly appraises the results of the PNC's 19th session, proceeding as it does from its invariable support for the Palestinians' struggle for liberation from the occupation regime and its recognition of their legitimate national rights, including the right to their own sovereign state.

Alexander Zotov

Capital which knows no frontiers

Alexei Kireyev

What the possessions of the biggest transnational monopolies have in common with the colonial empires of old is that the sun never sets behind their horizon

T rue, the sun does not shine equally brightly for all, and is sometimes obscured by clouds. And the clouds are by no means harmless ones, either.

Almost exactly four years ago, the Indian city of Bhopal found itself enveloped in a cloud of poison gas which had escaped from the tanks of a pesticide plant affiliated with the American Union Carbide transnational corporation. The tragedy resulted from flagrant violations of elementary safety rules by the plant's administration. It left more than a thousand dead, 200,000 poisoned, and 20,000 incapacitated for life (blind, suffering from disorders of the nervous system, paralyzed).

"What has happened in India can recur in the U.S.A. or any other country at any moment," a high-ranking official of the American Environmental Protection Agency commented then in a matter-of-fact manner. Neither him, nor any of the U.S. leaders pointed out the culprit then, however, although he was known anyway. The Bhopal tragedy, and many other tragedies like it, were caused by transnational monopoly capital.

"The second economy" of capitalism

What are the transnationals like today? These are imperialist monopolies which, to quote Lenin, have reached "a new stage of world concentration of capital and production." They monopolize whole industries and whole spheres of activity on the scale of individual countries and of the entire capitalist world economy. The transnationals account for over a third of the capitalist world's industrial output, more than a half of its foreign trade, and nearly 80 per cent of the patents for new equipment and technologies. The transnationals' subsidiaries and products are to be found in practically all the indus-

trialized capitalist states and developing countries.

The American transnationals constitute the nucleus of transnational monopoly capital. Exxon, General Motors, ITT and the like are enormous production and marketing complexes which have their subsidiaries in various countries, often thousands of kilometres apart. They turn over sums equalling the worth of gross national products of whole states. The American transnationals' foreign-based companies employ a work force totalling half that used by the manufacturing industry in the U.S. proper.

This "second economy" produces goods and offers services worth about 1.5 trillion dollars a year, a sum equalling nearly 40 per cent of the U.S. gross national product. This economy is over twice as large as those of West European powers like the F.R.G., France and Britain, and is second only to Japan's in size. The transnationals' production capitals, almost two thirds of them invested in industrialized capitalist states (Western Europe accounts for nearly 50% of the investments), constitute the "backbone" of the U.S. "second economy." American transnational capital has formed a tremendous economic complex abroad, with the headquarters in the U.S.

West European and Japanese monopolies are going all out to keep pace with the U.S. transnationals. In the early 1980s the American economy, for its part, became profitable to invest in. High bank interest rates attracted foreign capital like a magnet. A high dollar exchange rate encouraged foreign companies to increase export to the United States and to broaden their network of marketing facilities there. As the insatiable Pentagon devoured domestic accumulations, the American economy needed ever more financial injections from the outside. As a result, foreign exporters of goods and capitals captured about a


quarter of the U.S. home market. The West European and Japanese transnationals have also created their "second economy" inside the U.S. which, in some respects, even surpasses the American one. As a result, Western Europe and, to some extent, Japan have their "periphery" on the North American continent while being peripheral to the business activity of the American transnationals themselves.

For all the outward similarity of the "second economies" of the American and other centres of modern imperialism, there are substantial differences between them. Whereas the U.S. transnationals usually export their capital in the shape of direct or portfolio investments which give the investor a certain measure of control over the recipient country's economy, the bulk of West European and Japanese investments in the U.S. comprises securities and bills of exchange, i.e., merely titles of ownership rather than tools of production control.

The infiltration of foreign transnationals into the U.S. economy is sometimes seen as a sign of American imperialism being at the end of its tether and incapable of further expansion. This is hardly the case. The American transnationals are merely changing their strategy. They realize that in the dynamic world of today it is no longer possible to hold the lead in all the avenues of progress, that it is necessary to concentrate on what is likely to determine the balance of economic forces at the beginning of the next century. Therefore they flung the doors to the American market open to Japanese VCRs, hi-fi systems and cars. But then the United States' export of industrial electronics exceeds Japan's sevenfold, and more than 80 per cent of the data processing equipment, supercomputers included, operating in Western Europe, have been supplied by the American transnationals. The American aerospace industry is years ahead of its West European rivals. Such examples abound.

New conquistadors

The expansion of transnational capital has conserved the developing countries' economic dependence on the former "parent states" going back to colonial times. Only the forms of this dependence



Punish the Bhopal killers, Indians demand

TASS photo

have changed. By political manoeuvres, promises, bribes, military blackmail – and, quite infrequently, by direct interference in the developing countries' internal affairs – imperialism has built up a new, neocolonialist, system of exploitation. Transnational corporations employ various means of neocolonialist exploitation: non-equivalent trade exchange, manipulations with lending and dollar exchange rates, and various clever ploys. Over the past decade alone, U.S. corporations' investment in the developing world returned a 400 per cent interest, as much as an 800 per cent interest in Latin America and the Caribbean in the period under review.

The developing countries still import most of their producer goods, and earn most of their currency by export. The Western countries account for up to three fourths of the Third World's foreign trade, nearly a half of which is controlled by the transnationals. Because the transnationals own the marketing network of world capitalist trade (merchant marine, warehouses, insurance, credit and communication systems, etc.) they are in a position to control, directly or indirectly, about 70-95 per cent of the sales of the developing countries' 19 main export items. Specifically, the proportions of these countries' export commodity sales through the transnationals are as follows: phosphates and sugar, up to 60 per cent; rice, bananas, natural rubber, tin and oil, 75; bauxites, tea and copper, 85; coffee, cocoa beans, pineapples, chrome, to-

bacco, jute, 85-90; iron ore, up to 95 per cent.

The transnationals have dumped to the Third World most of their labour-consuming and environment-polluting production processes, turning individual countries into their "auxiliary factory shops." Whenever they find it necessary, they unceremoniously interfere in the host countries' internal affairs. Suffice it to recall the role played by the American ITT in engineering the fascist putsch in Chile. "The provision of dubious technologies, the building of outdated and environment-polluting factories, the plunder of national resources including minerals, wood and seafood – the list of the transnational corporations' crimes in the Third World is extremely long," wrote the French magazine *Afrique-Asie*.

In the mid-1980s a seemingly unexpected thing happened: the influx of the transnationals' capital into the developing countries dwindled by 25 per cent, and into Latin America by 55 per cent. Transnational business began to lose interest in the developing countries and started increasing its investments in the Western world's economy. The shift was due to a dramatic worsening of the developing countries' financial position caused by the transnationals – banking, not industrial ones, this time.

In the early 1980s, there functioned in the developing countries about 550 departments, 450 branches and 660 offices of transnational banks which credited industrial transnationals as well as local


businesses and governments. It was them that caught the developing world in the debt noose compelling it to spend most of its export earnings on servicing foreign debts. The industrial transnationals who had exported machines, equipment, food and other goods to the developing countries were put off by the latter's insolvency. The ever growing protectionism on the part of the Western countries which are the chief market for the Third World's traditional exports made the honouring of the debt a big problem.

The cheapness of labour in the developing countries is steadily losing its attractiveness to the transnationals owing to the large-scale introduction of effort-saving technologies and robotic complexes in the West. In the near future, the transnationals are likely to curtail their production of consumer and investment goods in the developing countries, to close down their plants there, and to move closer to the "centre" (as is already the case in the sphere of electronics), leaving behind in the Third World ecologically destructive and resources-consuming industrial plants. This will perpetuate the unequal international division of labour, of the entire system of the neocolonial exploitation of the developing world.

It is obvious, nevertheless, that such a system cannot exist forever. The transnationals will have to choose between brazen "daylight robbery" and cooperation on the basis of equality with the Third World. After all, the developing countries have other foreign trade partners, too. ■

Our common home

We are Europeans. Though each of us, naturally, regards himself a citizen of his own country. The concept of Europe is for us today purely geographical. But what of tomorrow?



An attempt "to perceive themselves as Europeans," members of a common family, is how I would interpret the Budapest meeting attended by peace campaigners from almost all the countries that signed the Helsinki Final Act. It was sponsored by the Hungarian Peace Council and held under the motto "Together for the promotion of the Helsinki process."

It was probably the first time ever that a conference of the kind had represented a wide range of public opinion not only from West but also from East European countries. Only yesterday we dubbed some of our colleagues of today "dissidents," a word we borrowed from the West. Today they – together with "formal" (also a Western coinage) peace committees – are reflecting on and debating the future of Europe. The U.S.S.R. delegation at the Budapest meeting included spokesmen from the Soviet Peace Committee, the Club for Social Initiatives and the Democratic Perestroika Club.

Too small a basket

I look through the Helsinki Final Act, the document whose complete text, when printed in the U.S.S.R., occasioned a burst of pride in some of our leaders, as was constantly emphasized both in speeches made by high-level officials and in the media, our magazine included. Taking a fresh look at this document now, you cannot fail to see in it an increasing number of norms that have not yet become norms for us in the Soviet Union.

For a long time the Soviet side attempted to put all its eggs in one basket, the military-political basket of the Helsinki Final Act. That basket, however, proved too small. Though arms control has made most headway compared with other issues, this has not helped reduce the number of issues that are still outstanding. Why? Because there cannot be genuine security without economic cooperation, contacts between people, the exchange of information and ideas, and above all genuine observance of

human rights, which is only possible, in my view, at a certain level of economic development and democracy in society, and a certain level of civic involvement on the part of its members. My viewpoint may seem disputable, but I am convinced that only by recognizing the priority importance of resolving human rights issues – alongside military-political ones – can we speak in earnest of a common European home.

In no sense do I think human rights can be "sorted out" at an international forum. Each country will have to resolve these issues on its own, exchanging experience but not making its own binding on others.

As always, human rights sparked off lively discussion at the meeting.

There was something unusual, however, about the Budapest debates. I would say that fuel was added to the flame by the dramatic changes under way in our country, changes that naturally affect the human rights sphere. Whether we like it or not, the fact remains that perestroika and democratization have turned some of our tried opponents into "ardent well-wishers" while some of our tested friends have been plunged into a state of confusion. It is no accident that the discussion of humanitarian problems revealed a difference of opinion between members of the Dutch delegation, between Germans from the G.D.R. and the F.R.G., and between the Hungarian delegates.

There were debates and dialogues inside the Soviet delegation as well, which is also a sign of change.

We need guarantees

I spoke with **Boris Nazarov, L.L.D.**, Head of the Human Rights Department at the All-Union School of Law.

"Boris Lazarevich, to my mind the present meeting is further evidence of how differently democracy is interpreted by us and our otherwise like-minded partners..."

"People use the same terminology, unaware that they are reading completely different meanings into these concepts."

"Are we not narrowing the gap between our interpretations of democracy?"

"Certainly. The attempt to do so is so sincere that many I talked with did their best to play down the differences even when they were ideological. But it is ideological differences that prove irreconcilable."

"What about our common European home?"

"We should approach the question realistically. The idea of a common European home is not at odds with what I have said. Since ideologies and positions differ, we should be looking for common interests in the areas in which they are to be found – in economics, politics, morals. Ideological confrontation finds its most concrete expression in the argument about the respective merits of capitalism and socialism. So let this argument continue, provided no armed force is used."

"Yet what, in your opinion, is democracy as it should be seen today?"

"Democracy is the advancement of the state, law and legality. Democracy primarily presupposes government by the people, popular self-government. The better this concept is implemented the more democracy there is."

"Democracy is often interpreted as all-permissiveness. We associate democracy with a certain degree of discipline in man which would prevent one doing what one wants without taking the interests of others into account."

"If I am not mistaken, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen states in part that every individual has the right to everything, the sole restriction being the right of others to the same. Today we are talking about a law-governed state..."

"In no sense do I believe that this is a panacea. The law-governed state has existed in the West for centuries, but we cannot borrow this concept in the form in which it is practised there for the simple reason that these practices have shown

that the law-governed state in existence has failed to eradicate violations of human rights. We have still to elaborate the concept of a law-governed socialist state. We may then be able to find the optimum variant to raise the level of democracy."

"Is there any real prospect of cooperation in the area of human rights?"

"The Helsinki Final Act and international human rights covenants are evidence of cooperation. All these, however, are at the level of normative acts. What we need is guarantees. Incidentally, the Western democracies have set up regional institutions on human rights, for example, a court to protect them, and a convention. Perhaps the time has come for us too to elaborate declaration formulating the essence of a socialist concept of human rights. In my view, the socialist countries need a regional institution on human rights issues. I believe that the existence of such an institution would help us improve the situation in this field, and at the same time, we would be more aware of the areas in which we could cooperate with the West Europeans."

"Human rights are a universal humanitarian concept. Then, what's the point of having 'our' concept differing from 'theirs'?"

"The socialist concept proceeds from the premise that human rights should be guaranteed for everyone, while bourgeois democracies do not set themselves this objective."

"Don't you think that if society can afford to maintain millions of unemployed – I am leaving aside the moral aspect of the issue – and some of the unemployed do not feel broke at all, this is a sure guarantee of the economic rights of all. I have in mind developed Western countries..."

"I don't think so. A million-strong army of the homeless eking out a miserable existence. Where do you see a guarantee of right in that? In no sense, however, can this paradox provide us with any excuse or satisfaction with regard to our own situation in this field."

"The question of human rights guarantees is topical for us too..."

"We need above all firm guarantees of human rights. This is, in my opinion, the weakest point in our legal system. Guarantees must be enshrined in the act itself to ensure the legislative protection of citizens. But here trying is not enough; it must be underpinned by the realization of what the substance of a normative act is. When we speak of the socialist concept of human rights we always imply that rights and duties are inseparable. Our normative acts, however, do not reflect this. I shall make myself clearer. An individual's rights are infringed on. He looks up the normative act and does not understand where he should turn for help. He cannot identify the party that should complement his right with a duty towards him. It could be the organization in which he works, it could be a district executive committee, but what is important is that the law should indicate the official responsible for this particular problem. All must be as clear as it can be. It could be the courts, also one of our weak points. This institution should address itself primarily to the protection of human rights whenever they are violated, in

any sense, in any sphere, in any field."

"Does our system contain guarantees against violations of human rights in the future?"

"We have now started reforms in economics, politics, law. Either we measure up to what we are planning to do, and serious legal guarantees will be an outcome, or we fall by the wayside, in which case any legal guarantees are out of the question."

"We lawyers must seriously address ourselves to elaborating the mechanism of human rights guarantees worldwide. Otherwise we shall not succeed. I have touched upon this problem here in Budapest. Lawyers from different countries could combine their efforts to bridge the gap between normative acts and the way they are implemented. In the different socio-political systems the gap is caused by different factors to be found in the economy, politics, morals. This is a humanitarian problem. All together we could work out the most acceptable mechanism to guarantee human rights..."

Tracing one's origins

Guarantees. This must have been a key word during our dialogue on rights and democracy. Yet besides the legal guarantees for the democratization of society, there is a further and to my mind very important element – the civil activity of its members.

Among the participants in the Budapest meeting I saw many familiar faces, despite the extended list of the people who were invited. It was not just that this conference was one of the many I attended. It was not just because "formal" peace committees from socialist countries were not yet ready to cooperate with all of their young and obstinate fellow-countrymen, sometimes of a different political complexion, who sat on many alternative committees and participated in civic initiatives. The reason lay in the low level of political activity among citizens in the West and the East alike.

Why do so few people join the various peace-making and human rights organizations? Reasons for this vary. In Eastern Europe, it is accounted for by economic problems and the fact that "human rights champion" was until recently a term of abuse in the socialist countries' political lexicon. Recently, though, the Soviet Union and some other socialist countries have seen a surge of political activity on the part of some strata of society. In the West people withdraw and concentrate on their individual concerns either because of economic difficulties or, on the contrary, because they are well off.

Two trends are now confronting each other and interacting in Europe. Every nation is becoming aware of its own uniqueness and assessing its history and identifying its problems, thus trying to get, as it were, a correct perception of itself. On the other hand, a large number of common problems are drawing all of them together. People are now beginning to reassess many post-war European phenomena.

Take, for instance, the presence of foreign troops on the territory of European states – the issue received lively discussion at the conference. The Hun-

garian journalist and member of parliament Zoltan Kiraly proposed a pull-out of all foreign troops by 1995, when the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War is to be celebrated. He said it would help to resolve many political issues. I do not share Kiraly's optimism that such a step could bring about a speedy solution of all political problems. Furthermore, NATO has not yet shown away enthusiasm for the idea of substantial reductions of U.S.S.R. and U.S. troops. Could it be that the member of parliament from Hungary was trying to look slightly beyond tomorrow? Meanwhile, more modest proposals are on the agenda. Among them are a reduction of the Allied troops in West Berlin to a negligible size.

What is our idea of a common European home? That was the question the participants in the Budapest meeting tried to answer. All agreed on one thing, to wit, the idea itself is fine. It has so many supporters that for the voices of acclaim one almost fails to hear the expressions of healthy scepticism and doubt, or see conflicting interpretations of the concept which, unless clarified, could prove an insurmountable barrier on the way to translating the idea as such into reality.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said recently that she would like to see a common European home but with privately owned furniture. A similar interpretation of the concept has also been manifested by some delegates I have talked with. And here, I think, is a more realistic idea of a common home.

Says **Walter Bohle**, of the Labour Party's international department vice-secretary (Netherlands):

"It is very important to build West-East relations on the basis of cooperation in as many fields as possible. Then even if something happens to some of today's leaders or if it occurs to a madman to set politics back, the situation will not change as quickly or easily as was the case in the past. We will have to become accustomed to a home that accommodates different systems, and their distinctive features will be respected in so far as both sides respect basic human rights."

...A home inhabited by prosperous neighbours who respect each other despite their considerable differences, active participants in the work being done at its numerous storeys. Today we Russians, Britons, Hungarians, Poles, French and Germans from both the G.D.R. and the F.R.G., and the other European nations, are still on its threshold. We are attempting to build something of the kind in our respective countries and are probably becoming Europeans in the wider sense of the word. For the time is drawing near when we will have every right to call our Old World a common home.

Galina Sidorova,

our special correspondent

BUDAPEST-MOSCOW

Love thy neighbour

Pensions: facts and figures

It is with a less aching heart than before that I return to my notes on our closest neighbours – the Finns – who are in some spheres far ahead of ourselves. The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet has just held an unusual (and perhaps, without irony, historic) session. There have been drastic changes in the state budget, with a far greater accent on social targets than previously. Next year's outlays on social welfare will exceed those of the current year by 27 billion rubles, and those provided for 1989 by the twelfth five-year plan by 16 billion.

This is a source of joy and hope. But we have drawn up many ideal (or idealistic?) plans before. However, we have learnt several things from our errors. Thus, in making up our plans we should not count too much on their being automatically fulfilled. We should do our bit to fulfil them. And while we are about it, it would do us no harm to know what others have achieved. Perhaps we can learn something from them too.

Let us study a socio-economic sphere, such as pensions. We are aware that a new law on pensions is to be adopted and that the bill is to be submitted for nationwide discussion. Perhaps it would benefit the people who are working on the bill and those who are to discuss it to know how our neighbours provide a proper and decent livelihood for veteran workers.

When you're 65

Eija Puttonen smiled as she welcomed me and said: "We are celebrating our birthday today. The Central Pension Security Institute was founded exactly 27 years ago."

Taking up her humorous cue, I congratulated Eija and her colleague Agneta Sarnesto on the occasion. I could not congratulate Eeva-Liisa Niinioja, the third person at the interview, as she belonged to another, though related, body – the Social Insurance Institution. Eija went on to say:

"When we moved into this building in 1976, it was the tallest in Helsinki. It has 12 storeys."

The number of offices for officials is not

a guarantee of efficiency. We know this from our own experience. Therefore Eija's statement failed to impress me. So we went on with the interview.

She told me that in Finland there are two categories of pension – so-called people's pensions and pensions for work. The purpose of the former is to provide a minimum level of subsistence. The latter is earnings related. How much does a veteran worker get a month on average? Two thousand eight hundred marks. And what is the minimum pension? One thousand nine hundred and sixty marks. (Permit me to remind the reader that according to the official exchange rate, there are four and a half marks to the U.S. dollar and seven marks to the ruble).

The people's pension system was introduced in 1939. The pension fund was formed on the basis of insurance contributions deducted from earnings. In 1957, 1962, 1984 and, finally, 1986 pensions were reformed. As a result, today the people's pension consists of two parts, basic and supplementary. It should

be explained that basic is the same for everyone. By contrast the supplementary part is not. Its purpose is to balance, to a certain degree, the sums received by those who get fairly low pensions and those who have earned adequate pay-related pensions. If a medium-income worker retires, in addition to his pension for work, he can only count on the basic part of the people's pension. However, the size of the supplement depends not only on the pay-related pension, but also on the person's residence, family status and a number of other circumstances. The sum an upper-bracket worker can receive on retirement, i.e., the combined sum of his earnings-related pension and the people's pension cannot exceed 60 per cent of his earnings.



Sigrid Kontturi has hung the walls of her room in a pensioners' home with her own pictures

*Continued. See first instalment in issue No. 45.



The pay-related pension depends not only on the size of earnings prior to retirement, but also on the number of years the individual has worked. If he has worked for 40 years, he is entitled to 60 per cent of his pay. Payments to employees in the public sector are higher than those to persons who have worked in the private sector. They come to 66 per cent of earnings. To receive such a pension one has to have worked for 30 years.

I asked what earnings the percentages are based on. Eija and Agneta patiently explained to me: the average annual income for two of the last four years before retirement. The pension is, however, index-linked and rises automatically with the cost of living.

At what age do workers retire? At 65, they replied. However, since 1986 retirement age has not always been the same. One can start drawing an old-age pension at the age of 60. But it will be somewhat smaller. Others can retire later. If a person goes on working, he will be entitled to an increase of 1.5 per cent of his earnings for every year worked after 65.

What happens in the event of misfortune, serious illness or occupational injury? In this case a person can count on a disability allowance. According to the law, an individual is entitled to a full disability allowance if his capacity for work has dropped to 40 per cent. If his ability to work has fallen only to 60 per cent, the allowance will be paid only in part. If he falls ill or has suffered an injury, his ability to work is assessed on the basis not only of purely medical criteria but also of social factors, such as education, age and housing conditions.

How big is the disability allowance? A full allowance, they said, is equivalent to the old-age pension the person would receive. Since 1986 they have started to grant early disability allowances. If a per-



The residents of the old people's home have all sorts of hobbies

son is 55 and cannot work as efficiently as before, but cannot be retired because of a disability, he will be entitled to such an allowance. There are also unemployment pensions. They are awarded to people of 60-64 years of age who have been out of work for a long time. It should be mentioned that in Finland the unemployed make up about five per cent of the able-bodied population.

Allowances are also paid to families in the event of the loss of a breadwinner. A widow who married her deceased spouse before he was 65 and has a dependent child under 18 would receive such an allowance. A widow of at least 40 who was married for more than three years before the death of her husband would also be entitled to an allowance. How big is the allowance? If there are three or more dependents, it is equal to the old-age pension or disability allo-

wance. If there are two, it is three quarters and if there is one, it is half of the regular pension.

Eeva-Liisa explained to me that most pensioners pay income tax. Tax on the average pension of 2,800 marks is about 19 per cent. However, the allowance for the loss of breadwinner and some other benefits are tax exempted. Agneta added that veteran workers and invalids pay only half fares on public transport. Eija remarked that, in her opinion, a pension of 2,000 marks is not enough to live normally in Helsinki. The elderly are faced with other problems too, such as loneliness. People try to keep their spirits up, forming pensioners' associations, holding meetings and even dances. Eeva-Liisa said the local authorities and public organizations try to help pensioners in this respect.

Can pensioners work? If they can, are any limits imposed on their total income? No, there is no limit. If you receive a pension, you can engage in some kind of activity such as handicrafts, to earn a little money. The problem is that it is difficult for an old person to find work because of unemployment.

I said that in the U.S.S.R. many people eligible for retirement continue to work not only to maintain their standard of living, but also to keep up the habitual tenor of life. They prefer to be with people and feel they are needed.

In Finland, I was told, many people think differently. They believe that it is better to retire before 65, even to receive a lower pension and grow flowers than to tax your strength, which is bound to be somewhat exhausted by then. It is better to relax than to strain yourself to meet the daily challenge of present-day standards in work. The pressure of work is so great that you cannot ease off, as it calls not just for concentration of ef-

fort, but very often for creativity as well.

A nurse riding a bicycle

The youngest resident of this old people's home is 64, and the oldest - 96. The home is located in Kontulan, a suburb of Helsinki. I am grateful to Vladimir Shmyganovski, my colleague from Izvestia, for getting me there, as it would have taken me hours to reach the place by public transport. The home is situated in a well-kept park with paved paths and plenty of fresh air. I saw a dark-blue bus-type vehicle with a low step arrive at the building with a group of invalids. The passengers alighted from it slowly, but without help from others.

We were introduced to Airi Paasivuori, the superintendent who was at once efficient and courteous. The first thing you notice is that the place is immaculate, and the next is that it is a real home, full of life and activity.

As Airi showed us around the rooms and corridors she told us that there are three units with 50 residents in each. Each person has a separate room with all modern conveniences. How many staff are there? Two nurses to every 10 residents. By day there are normally eight nurses to a unit, in the evening two and at night one on duty. Just then a nurse passed on a bicycle as if to illustrate what the superintendent was saying. There was a basket attached to the handle bars. Airi then took us to the kitchen for residents who wished to cook their own food. It is decorated in bright red and snowy white. But most people here prefer to eat the food prepared by professional cooks. Together with other auxiliary personnel, there are 17 in all. In yet another room the floor is carpeted. We saw three elderly women sitting in armchairs. They interrupted their conversation for a moment to look at us.

We asked if we could visit somebody's room. The superintendent invited us to see Sigrid Kontturi. The walls are hung with pictures she painted herself. Sigrid is an amateur painter. She used to be a housewife. Eight years ago her husband died. Having no relatives she came to live here.

"I like it here," she explained, "a room with all modern conveniences. It's true that you have to go out into the corridor to take a shower. On the ground floor there is a swimming pool and a sauna. I get everything I need here, including my clothes."

"A pension?"

"My pension is 3,000 marks a month. Out of this sum I am allowed 600 marks' pocket money."

Among the numerous things that Sigrid obviously treasures is a telephone. The superintendent explained to me that people can take the telephones they used in their former homes. This applies to TV sets too. Those who do not wish to share the TV sets in the sitting rooms can have one in their own room.

Then Airi took us to the so-called service centre. It is a dining hall with a buffet, open to anyone who has a pensioner's certificate. Well prepared meals are served here at much lower prices than elsewhere.

Of course, the care the residents get here, the services and conveniences they enjoy, are of paramount importance. But it appears that the accent on activities that make one's life full are just as important. The workshops certainly impressed me. In one they make pottery, in another they do wood carving, in another again they do enamel work. There is also a dress-making shop and a weaving shed. (It should be mentioned that some of the items are sold by the home).

There is also a choir and groups studying foreign languages. For instance, 15 people are studying Russian. We passed a billiards room where the game was, as always, giving rise to subdued passions. In the gymnasium a trim-figured woman in her seventies or eighties was vigorously pedalling an ergometric bicycle. You could see that everyone was doing what he or she wanted. However, the atmosphere prompts people to do something useful or interesting. For instance, 96 people are regularly engaged in the workshops. Then Airi said: "I've got something else to show you."

Crossing the yard we entered another building. This is a block of 90 flats, one of 25 of its kind in Helsinki. The residents are pensioners who do not have home of their own. Their monthly rent adds up to only 450 marks, which cover the charges for electricity, telephone and cleaning.

The rent for a one-room (plus kitchen) flat like that would normally come to 1,500-2,000 marks a month. The flats are comfortable. We learned this when we visited Tyne Aalto. She has been living here since her husband died 14 years ago. "I cook my own meals in this kitchen," she said.

I saw a lot of furniture in the room. There was a Singer treadle sewing machine, bookshelves, black-and-gold khokhloma souvenirs and a telephone under an embroidered cover which, I learned, Tyne had made herself.

"Do you feel lonely here?" I asked.

"Why, no. You can always visit the other building. Then the doctors visit you three times a week."

The superintendent took us back to the main building. We wanted to make sure of a few figures. A nurse is paid between 5,000 and 6,000 marks a month and the superintendent 11,000. A cleaner gets from 3,500 to 4,000. Residents receive a fifth of their pensions, but not less than 400 a month. The time a pensioner spends on the waiting list ranges from four to six months. If a resident needs serious medical aid, he or she is taken to a special hospital (there are three in the district of Kontulan).

Then Airi showed us the assembly hall at the end of the corridor.

When we arrived, several brisk though elderly ladies were arranging chairs in the hall. Three times a week a clergyman comes to deliver sermons to those who want them. I asked how many people attend. Airi said:

"Not more than five." Glancing at the ladies arranging the chairs, she explained that they had been dancing to an orchestra the night before. About three hundred attended the party. They hold such parties twice a week.

* * *

Of course, the overwhelming majority of pensioners (about 90 per cent) live in their own homes, and not in such comfortable old people's homes. There are more than a million pensioners in Finland (out of a total population of under five million). But they are not left uncared for. Eleven per cent of the gross national product is spent on all kinds of pensions.

Aid to people living in their own homes is well organized too. The local municipal authorities look after the elderly. (There are 460 district municipalities with widely differing populations, from half a million in Helsinki to under a thousand in some villages.) Public organizations and private companies also contribute to the welfare of the elderly. Payment for most services is fixed according to the pensioner's income. Among the services are regular care, domestic cleaning and cooking.

In an interview a social welfare worker said that care for the old should give the pensioner a sense of respect for his or her personality and dignity. I believe that Finland has done a great deal to ensure this.

Vladimir Zhitomirsky

our own correspondent
HELSINKI-MOSCOW

Photos by author and from a booklet distributed by the Central Pension Security Institute

A knotty problem

The Supreme Soviet of Estonia at an extraordinary session has taken, along with other decisions, one that is quite unprecedented, ruling that all-Union laws shall not be applicable in Estonia if the republican legislative bodies refuse to adopt them. The leadership of "Sajūdis," the Lithuanian movement in support of perestroika, put forward a resolution suggesting that changes be introduced in the Lithuanian Constitution, making some of its provisions run counter to the corresponding constitutional norms of the Union. The republic's Supreme Soviet refused to support the resolution, thus provoking considerable disappointment among the movement's followers.

As I write, similar debates are under way in the Latvian parliament.

How are we to regard this development? According to existing legislation, it is the prerogative of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and its Presidium to decide how the legislative acts of a given republic should correspond to similar documents of the Union as a whole. My opinion is that such a vast country, with many different nationalities living in it, should have all-Union laws as well as republican ones, provided they never contradict each other. Otherwise we will arrive at what the great Russian satirist Saltykov-Shchedrin called "the twilight of the law," in other words — arbitrary rule under which the state is turned into a helpless pawn in someone's iron grip, and citizens become an oppressed mass. Had legal arbitrariness been made a general principle, we would have had not a united state, but a federation of independent states with very weak internal links. In other words, the very principle of the Soviet Union would have been undermined.

The simplest thing would be to attribute the incident to an outburst of nationalism, to poor educational work or to public pressure. However, there must have been something to trigger off this outburst. And parliamentarians — prominent public figures whose duty is to educate people — should, at least theoretically, be guided by principles, and not by external influences.

I don't think I'm wrong in saying that there are people who are not content with the situation in which all-Union laws have equal force in every republic, and the Soviet Union, represented by the supreme bodies of power and administration, supervises the integrity of the laws of the country as a whole.

This divergence of views is in no way abnormal; it is pluralism in practice. On the other hand, existing laws must be abided by even if a person does not like this or that provision. This is one of the principles of a law-governed state.

Another no less important principle is that in a law-governed state the standard of legislation must be qualitatively higher than it has been in the past. We have a number of examples of directives that though adopted with best of intentions were professionally incompetent, harming business instead of

facilitating it, and while solving one problem accumulating others, thus eventually undermining the people's confidence in the law. Let us recall, for instance, the notorious decree on cooperative taxes, numerous ministerial instructions that did similar damage to the ecology and many other glaring examples of malpractice! We present laws for nationwide discussion so as not to be trapped again by the mistakes of the past. Here I would like to stress that discussion presumes neither unthinking approval nor a priori rejection. What is needed is constructive suggestions.

That is why it's necessary to distinguish between seething passions, and serious campaign for more efficient legislation and a socialist multinational law-governed state where the rights of the republics are in harmony with the rights of the Union, and where the citizen's responsibility before the authorities is complemented by the authorities' responsibility to the citizen. I would imagine that most of my compatriots have a stake in this process. But in dealing with this problem, one needs patience and wisdom. Haste is not becoming to law-makers, as has been demonstrated more than once in the past.

The main task today is the construction of our multinational state on the basis of the equality of all before the law. Those, who — wittingly or otherwise — seek democracy and perks exclusively for themselves are playing in the hands of the opponents of perestroika, who wish to halt the restructuring of our society and political system, the democratization of all branches of our life.


Again, how are we to regard this?

Instead of a direct answer I'd like to share memories of a meeting. In the winter of 1947, after the first postwar elections to the Supreme Soviet of Lithuania, three young Komsomol functionaries, myself included, spoke to the then First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, Antanas Sniečkus. Among other things we discussed a number of problems relating to the bitter struggle against the nationalists. Kazla, a Komsomol organizer from Prenai district, who later died from a bandit's bullet, asked if we should not perhaps remove the article concerning a republic's right to sovereignty. It is to this article that nationalists most often refer.

"No, of course not, comrades," objected Sniečkus. "Under no circumstances shall we remove this article. On the contrary, we in Lithuania and our comrades in Moscow must always remember it and work in such a way that no sane person could ever dream either of infringing on a republic's sovereignty or of opposing its interests to the interests of the Union."

I feel that these words are very relevant today.

Alexander
Didusenko



About
pluralism and
constructive
approach

A new look of socialism

Anatoly Butenko, D. Sc. (Philosophy)

The seventy-odd years that have elapsed since the revolution brought not only sincere belief and fervent hopes for the quick construction of socialism, but also led to the loss of illusions and, at times, open disenchantment: time failed to confirm the initial hopes that a new order was just around the corner.

In these circumstances there is no task more important both from the point of view of theory and practice, than to return to our initial socialist ideals, take another look at them, and read a deeper meaning in their unclouded sources.

Shortage of ideals

A new society cannot be built successfully without having a clear idea of what you are building, what you are creating. For, unlike capitalism, which is formed and changes of its own accord, socialism was established **consciously**, on the basis of certain principles and with due regard to objective realities and conditions. And that presupposes scientific foresight, which forecasts the main features of a socialist society.

But it is not only the practical aspect that matters. No less important is the ideological aspect, the requirements of public consciousness. Three years of long and blunt criticism of the distortions and deformations of socialism have resulted in the destruction in the minds of many people of the former socialist ideal. As a result, an ideological vacuum has appeared, which the anti-socialist forces, especially nationalist forces, are using for their own ends.

How can we today reach a correct understanding of the future?

When the question is discussed of how to impart a new quality and modern look to socialism today, how to give it a new lease on life, this does not mean that it will

be done by waving a magic wand and attributing new and desirable qualities to the new system. Equally wrong are those who believe that what is needed is to sit down and draw up a new blueprint of socialism and then by means of ideological injections implant the new ideas in the minds of all working people. That could only produce another Utopia built on sand.

In reality nothing new needs inventing. All that has to be done is to interpret socialism more precisely and deeply, to understand its main features and regularities.

The task of the revolutionary perestroika now underway in the Soviet Union is, as I understand it, to break the resistance of the conservative and bureaucratic forces, destroy all anti-humane structures that hinder progress and establish genuine socialism as a really humanist system, corresponding to the ideals of the working people and the realities of our times.

The main features of this genuine socialism will differ very greatly from the present Soviet society. And not only in the economic and political spheres, but also at the level of culture and the nature of the ideological life.

What are its distinctive features?

So what are we building?

Predominantly the public socialist ownership of the means of production and social development will form the economic foundation of a socialist society, not a state-bureaucratic system. Since the level of development of the instruments of labour and the productive forces differ in the various branches of the national economy, and their growth in some spheres is uneven, socialism everywhere must be an economic system

not just with two forms of socialist property (state and collective farm-cooperative) as was believed only recently but a system with many different forms of ownership: public, collective farm-cooperative, cooperative, as well as individual ownership, private, personal and so on, although public-socialist ownership will play the dominant role.

This will ensure priority for public interests, with the most effective use of the available means of production, and for social progress. At the same time, it will guarantee that an economically independent individual will not be just a hireling of the state (that will be ruled out by the existence and development of alternative forms of business, such as cooperatives, individual labour, family-operated businesses and so on). The working people themselves will not only produce material and spiritual values, but will have the right to dispose of them, to run the affairs of enterprises and of society.

The socialist economy, in which the dominant role will be played by socialist property and will have different forms of ownership in the different spheres of production, will be a planned cost-accounting economy geared to commodity production. Individual enterprises and their work collectives will be independent in their activity, operating on the basis of self-management, cost-accounting and greater efficiency. Socialism does not need just any kind of planned commodity production, but only the kind that caters to the interests of consumers at all levels, a form of production that seeks to meet their requirements effectively and at the least possible expense.

The political system of a socialist society will not be, as in the recent past, a bureaucratic authority alienated from the working people, but genuine power of the people, that is "a government of the people by the people." (K. Marx). In other words, self-government of the people, non-political, without a state. However, at that stage of socialism where social and class differences still exist in society, this non-political form of self-government envisaged by Marx as replacing state government cannot yet be established. It would be more realistic to speak of the socialist self-government of the people, which will be preserved for some time, retaining political forms and a state, which are also important elements in the new vision of socialism.

Self-government as Lenin understood it

This new interpretation of people's self-government in the first phase of the new society, which develops previously held views on people's self-government, is the product of experience and generalized practice. For today it is not the Soviet Union alone that has abolished capitalism, but a number of fraternal countries as well. Their experience confirms that creating a classless society is a much more difficult task than had once seemed. The abolition of the old forms of exploitation of man by man and the formation of a classless society do not occur simultaneously. In Soviet society the old forms of exploitation and the exploiter classes were abolished before the Great Patriotic War. Soviet society today has no opposing antagonistic classes, no exploitation of one class by another, and in that sense has no exploitation of man by man. Nevertheless it remains a society in which different classes exist, as do different class interests. A state political organization also persists. That

means that there are still rulers and ruled.

In these circumstances, when there are no exploiter classes, but society is still made up of different classes, and politics and political power persist, what can and must be ensured is not communist peoples' self-government but its socialist form, which **still** retains its political features, but **already** operates as a democratic system of running the affairs of the state and society and operates increasingly through the people. As was pointed out at the 27th Congress of the CPSU, "In socialist society, particularly under the present circumstances, government should not be the privilege of a narrow circle of professionals. We know from our extensive experience as well as theory that the socialist system can develop successfully only when the people really run their own affairs, when millions of people are involved in political life. That is self-government by the working people, as Lenin saw it. It is the essence of Soviet power. The elements of self-government develop within rather than outside our statehood, increasingly penetrating all as-

pects of state and public life, enriching the content of democratic centralism and strengthening its socialist character."

Socialist democracy is acquiring a new image. Glasnost will spread still further, opening up what today still remains outside its boundaries. The electoral system will change, as will the structure and methods of operation of all bodies of power.

When we speak of the new features of democracy, we mean not only the extension of the rights and freedoms of citizens, which did not exist in the past. We also mean greater glasnost, which will allow people to have their own views on all matters. It will imply real criticism and self-criticism, not a pretence of it, and the masses' control over the actions of the authorities. It also means a radical restructuring of the entire political system.

Naturally, it is hard to foresee all aspects of the future. But nevertheless the socialism we are calling for will be a system of social relations characterized by a new, free working man holding the dominant position in society. ■

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Hard currency hunt

The cry from the heart that recently sounded in the TV programme Good Evening, Moscow put even its imperturbable compère, Boris Notkin, slightly off balance. Vyacheslav Zaitsev, director of the well-known Moscow Fashion House, exposed the "business practices" current at the Russian Federation's Ministry of Public Services. Having been granted the right to conduct its own transactions on the foreign market, the Ministry exercises this right in a rather peculiar way: it willingly delegates officials to attend the "first night" Soviet fashion shows there, and that's that. Back home, the officials do not lift a finger to take advantage of our fashion successes and sign sales contracts, although there are prospective buyers galore.

As a result, the ideas of our fashion designers come back to us incorporated into suits and dresses of French, Italian and American manufacture although if Soviet-made, these garments could earn francs, lire and dollars in the West.

The predicament in which the Fashion House has found itself is nothing new. The press has repeatedly drawn attention to the chances of earning foreign currency missed by ministerial officials of various ranks. As if to make up for their sluggishness, there is now a pronounced tendency here (shown not only by the ladies who appeared, with their backs to the camera, on a popular TV programme) to make the most of such opportunities right on the spot, without bothering to leave the country.

A correspondent for a leading French newspaper complained to his Moscow colleagues recently that the hotel on Leninsky Prospekt where he put up charged him 140 dollars a day – as much as a four-star hotel in the West, although the standard of comfort wouldn't merit the place even a half-star rating here. We've got so used to the blessings of staying in our hotels – rotten plumbing, faulty TV sets and "watch-dogs" on every floor to protect our chastity – that we don't even complain. Moreover, our hotels charge us less than they do foreign guests. When we happen to get abroad, we usually settle for cheaper and less pretentious hostery. Now a foreign visitor to our country is not offered much of a choice...

What makes matters worse is that exorbitant hard-currency charges, air fares, etc., are demanded not only from visiting newsmen or businessmen, but also from the foreign employees of joint enterprises functioning in Moscow. This is inevitably having an effect on the ratio of rouble to hard-currency investments in their joint capital.

Few Muscovites know that ours is one of the world's most expensive cities to maintain an office in. It is only big-business Western corporations that can afford to pay 150,000 dollars a year for the honour of being represented in Moscow. The cost is prohibitive for small companies which, incidentally, possess the latest in high technology and are only too willing to do business with Soviet production plants and cooperatives. We ought to give small and medium-size companies a hand in this, offer them

*Felix
Goryunov*



**Shortsightedness
is bad
for business**

favourable terms and cast about for ways of funding joint ventures with them.

There is no socio-economic task more important today than that of saturating our domestic market with goods and services. By attracting foreign capital and engaging in joint business undertakings with foreign companies we can go a long way towards doing so. The appropriate laws, binding on all Soviet institutions and citizens, have been passed. Somehow, these laws haven't made foreign businessmen exactly thronging to make deals with Moscow. Many of them still have their doubts about our economy being restructured in earnest and our reforms being here to stay. Out of the 120 joint enterprises set up over the past two years, a mere 10 to 15 are now operating.

Earning hard currency is not really the chief purpose of joint business undertakings. Joint ventures are intended to help us manufacture many of the items now on our import list and bring competitive pressure to bear on our domestic "entrepreneurs" who seek to meet their gross income targets through price rises. The efforts now being made by certain ministries, local authorities and, recently, some cooperatives to pump hard currency out of joint enterprises are clearly at odds with these objectives.

Hard-currency extortions are motivated by the best of intentions, of course: we have to expand our hotel network and import new equipment (such as snow-ploughs) for our municipal economy. That's all very well and good, but shortsightedness is unlikely to be a great boon to anyone out to do business on a commercial scale.

Moscow is to become a major international business centre. This calls for a modern business infrastructure: an extensive choice of telecommunication, information, advertising, technical, transport, hotel and cultural services offered at competitive prices.

This infrastructure can be built on credits obtained from Soviet and foreign banks, on the money earned by joint enterprises and, chiefly, through increasing export potential and using Moscow's scientific, technological and creative reserves. Vyacheslav Zaitsev's success abroad is just one of these reserves. Hopefully, the foreign trade amalgamation Mosinter set up a month ago under the Moscow City Council Executive Committee will be able to bring all these reserves into play.

I started this article intentionally with examples of how hard currency is lost rather than gained. These examples go to show that we are still economically incompetent and still unable to trade with the outside world with long-term public and national interests in mind. We still have a great deal to learn. Unless we master philosophy of modern commerce, neither our social sphere nor our economy stand to gain a great deal from our international business contacts.

The so-called "informals," regarded as exotic until a year or two ago, are now taken for granted here as more or less habitual features of our social landscape. The fact that the public has got used to them does not amount to their universal acceptance. The informals have their ardent advocates and their vehement opponents. Opinions sometimes clash for the simple reason that people engaged in an argument over a certain issue are actually talking about different things coming under the same name. Whom do they mean by saying that the informals are good or bad? The rockers, the hippies, the Democratic Perestroika, the Civic Dignity? Any difference between them? There certainly is! Some groups are asocial, or neutral at best, and others pose as a political force advocating (or opposing) the current political course.

For all the appeal of the former as social and socio-psychological phenomenon, we shall now concentrate on the latter. And, to avoid confusion, let's call them independent groups, associations or movements. Incidentally, that's what they call themselves.

Specifying the point at issue, however, will not detract any from the heat of the argument. On the contrary, it will lay bare the division of public opinion on the informals. On the one hand, we have the **civil servants** who think that once the policy line has been set, the directives submitted, and the "pep talk" meted out, everything will click in place and, given due control and continuous unabating pressure the desirable state of affairs will be attained. From this angle, any unauthorized "grassroots" activity is useless, at best, and harmful anyway.



"Navigare necesse est"

Leonid Ionin

On the other hand, there are the informals themselves who think that the democratic reforms proclaimed cannot be carried out by injunction, that the latter runs counter to the very essence of these reforms. What's more, it hardly makes any difference whether the **means** of advance are right. Informal organizations and initiatives are not the means of achieving democracy, they **are** democracy per se.

I think the informals are right in that democracy cannot be established by force, in that the end is "tinged" (and, in the long run, fully determined) by the means selected to achieve it. I agree with them that their work does not merely set the stage for democratic reforms but is, in itself, a study in democracy per se.

As for the civil servants who want an "official democracy," I am sure they've got another think coming.

The argument over the informals, the non-government organizations is not of an academic nature by far. It is an argument that may decide the fate of our country. When working for democracy, we can't go by trial and error, because an "error" may land us in something else, namely another authoritarian regime, another "personality cult" and another "stagnation period" which will dash the present generation's and the previous generations' hopes for a better future. In fact, such an "error" will amount to a catastrophic failure.

Society is often likened to a ship.

Imagine a tidal wave setting a grounded ship afloat.

Informal democratic activity is just such a wave, I am sure. Some may object that informal movements are not all that good, that quite a few of them encroach on our social ideals and may cause the erosion of socialist values. But who says that sailing in the high seas — let alone in the high seas of history — is safe?

Who wants to stay fast aground? As the ancients aptly put it, "Navigare necesse est" — a ship has got to sail.

Murky waters

Cuban émigrés in the U.S. play a special role in the shaping and implementation of American policy towards their former homeland and Latin America as a whole. Only a small percentage of them are actively involved, but this minority enjoys powerful economic and political backing.

From our own correspondent
Vitaly Sobolev

"Liberate Cuba by the 1990s!" is the ambitious goal set by the latest newly-baked counterrevolutionary organization which styles itself as the "assembly of the Cuban people." To begin with, it plans to convene something in the nature of an all-émigré parliament. True, the idea was rejected offhand by the leaders of other groups of "gusanos" (literally: worms). They too never tire of demonstrating their vitality and far-reaching designs, doing everything in their power too foster anti-Cuban sentiment in Washington.

Secret channels

Popular legend has it that underneath the Hotel Nacional situated on the Havana waterfront there are underground passages that reach far beyond the hotel. The mafia which at one time wielded tremendous influence in Cuba made the hotel its headquarters. It was at the gambling tables of the Nacional that mafia agents distributed handouts among Batista's henchmen. The dictator himself pocketed a generous rake-off from the gambling joints that thrived there under his wing. Considering the kind of partners the mafiosi had the "emergency exits" might be seen as a curious testimony to their foresight. Their real preoccupation, however, was with the invisible channels leading from nearby Florida where at that time there were some 60,000 Cuban émigrés, not a few of whom were votaries of illegal business.

The revolution cut off the flow of dollars and narcotics through the secret channels; the contraband trade had to bypass the island. But the greatly expanded Cuban colony in Miami is still directly involved in that profitable business. Seventy per cent (about 40 billion dollars

worth annually) of the marijuana and cocaine consumed by Americans enters the U.S. through Florida. A good part of this money finds its way into banks and companies belonging to the Cuban émigrés and is used to feed all manner of "juntas" and "assemblies," not to speak of the anti-Cuban lobby in Washington.

The political leaders of the "gusanos" have also perfectly legal sources of income. For one thing, wealthy Latin Americans from different countries have about 35 billion dollars deposited in Miami banks. Then there is the local airport, the second biggest in the U.S., for passenger traffic. Miami is also a big foreign trade centre: last year its seaport handled 9 billion dollars worth of cargo and its airport, 5 billion dollars worth. Besides, U.S. companies operating south of the Rio Grande readily make use of the services of Cuban émigrés.

Nevertheless the Florida political scene has a distinct taint of illegality. Ever since Batista's time the criminal element has sought backstage commanding positions in the émigré political structure. And if one of its trumps is its connections with the mafia, the patronage of the U.S. secret services is another. That is why the counterrevolutionaries show no desire to demobilize.

Reaping what was sown

Today the United States is reaping the bitter fruits of what it has sown. This applies not only to the drug trafficking by the CIA-nurtured "gusanos." The latter have also pioneered in aerial piracy. Between 1960 and 1964, for instance, they hijacked 30 airplanes from Cuba to the United States (not to speak of 265 sea-going vessels) which were never returned. Later émigrés hijacked about a dozen aircraft in the opposite direction. The planes were returned to the Americans and legal proceedings instituted against the hijackers. The U.S. belatedly signed an agreement with Cuba on ending the piracy. Nevertheless the initiators

of the air banditry were allowed to go scot free in the U.S. Moreover, they still find application for their talents. In the course of the investigation of the murder of the Salvadoran Archbishop Romero traces leading to the Cuban counter-revolutionaries were discovered. One of them, Rene Corvo, together with accomplices from the "Brigade 2506" (the force that landed at Playa Giron) is now training Nicaraguan contras. Work has been found for them also in the present U.S. anti-Panama campaign.

In a word, the "gusanos" are still very much in demand. On the other hand, they are a troublesome lot. The crime rate in Florida, high enough as it is, rises with the influx of each new wave of émigrés. For a long time the U.S. authorities racked their brains for some way to cope with the 2,500 prisoners of Cuban origin who staged revolts in prisons in Georgia and Louisiana. Cuba, once again displaying good will, provided the U.S. authorities with information about their criminal records, and later, at the request of the American government, agreed to take them back.

Let them go

In its attitude to those who wish to leave the country the Cuban revolution has always been guided by the principle that "the building of socialism is a voluntary matter."

The first post-revolutionary wave of emigration carried away a great many political and ideological opponents of the new government: supporters of the dictator, personnel of American companies and employers. Many specialists in the sugar and mining industry and 3,000 doctors, half of the country's total left. As Fidel Castro observed: "We lost the intellectual elite which could not adapt to the conditions of the revolution - the sacrifice and struggle it demanded." The first Cuban immigrants were given generous assistance by the U.S. authorities, assistance arrivals from other Latin American countries could only dream of. According to some estimates, by 1978 a total of one billion dollars had been spent on them. It was the first settlers in Florida, those most firmly established economically and with the most clearly defined political views who determined and still determine the atmosphere in the Cuban colony in Florida.

Emigration from Cuba proceeded unevenly, it had its ebbs and flows and at times dropped to nil. Having admitted the first wave of refugees, the U.S. administration, as part of its blockade of the Isle of Freedom, cut off all transport communi-



Cuban émigrés often find themselves at odds with U.S. law. The husband of this woman (right) is in jail. Even there "former Cubans" are stirring trouble, going on rampage and setting jails to fire (above)

Photos from Newsweek magazine (U.S.A.)



cation with it, and consequently all legal emigration, believing it politically more advantageous to encourage illicit flight.

It was at this time that the "gusanos" resorted to air and sea piracy. In order to end the piracy and offer a reasonable alternative to those who were ready to risk crossing over in flimsy boats, the Cuban authorities made the small port of Camarioca a free exit point. This was in the second half of the 1960s, the period of the radicalization of the Cuban revolution, the second stage of the agrarian reform and the nationalization of the services and trade spheres. Many private businessmen hastened to leave. The U.S. administration, seeing that the opening of the Camarioca port might end its control over the influx of immigrants from Cuba, agreed to fly them out, and the Cuban government offered the Varadero airport for the purpose. In 1971, however, the "freedom flights" were discontinued by Washington.

The third wave of emigration reached its peak in 1980. Having closed all legal channels, the U.S. again tried to make political capital by stimulating illegal exodus. To this end the right of asylum issue raised in Latin America was exploited. According to the relevant convention, that right can be applied for at foreign diplomatic missions "in emergencies by those who are persecuted by individuals, mobs over which the authorities have lost control, or by the authorities themselves."

By the spring of 1980 a large number of Cubans who had failed to obtain U.S. entry visas and hoped to get them by demanding diplomatic asylum gathered at the embassies of some Latin American

countries in Havana. They were not entitled to the right of asylum since no one was persecuting them or preventing them from leaving the country. But they were spurred on by the noisy acclamation in the Western radio broadcasts of the first "heroes" who had forced their way into embassies — primarily those of Peru and Venezuela. At first some of them did succeed in obtaining entry visas by this means.

However, the number of instances of forcible entry into embassies increased, stolen trucks and buses being used for the purpose. The lives of both, the Cuban police guarding the embassies and of the diplomatic personnel, were endangered. And after the Cuban guard at the gates of the Peruvian embassy was killed in one such assault, the guards were removed from that embassy and later from the Venezuelan as well. All those who were issued visas were allowed to leave.

As time went on it became clear that official Washington's promises that the Cuban émigrés would be welcomed with open arms were not being lived up to in practice. There seemed no way out of the conflict situation. Recalling the experience of Camarioca, the Cuban authorities again offered another free exit port — Mariel, not far from the capital. Cuban émigrés in Florida who had friends and relatives in Cuba wishing to leave the country could come for them by boat to Mariel. There were days when more than a thousand crafts, big and small, piled up in Mariel harbour in response to the Cuban government's offer.

And once again it was the U.S. that tried to put obstacles in the way of the émigrés. Owners of yachts and launches were threatened with a fine of 2,000 dollars for each passenger, confiscation of their boats or five years in prison. But the Cuban colony in Miami again showed that it could stand its ground.

Meanwhile in Cuba, besides the movement toward Mariel of those looking for the "promised land," other far bigger demonstrations which the press called "the march of the militant people" were taking place. Millions of Cubans marched through the streets carrying posters reading: "Down with the Gusanos!" and "Let Them Go!" and condemning the anti-social elements. Indeed, the third wave of emigration took with it large numbers of the scum of society: petty criminals, drug addicts and prostitutes. More than two and a half thousand of them soon came into conflict with the American law enforcement agencies, which to this day are at a loss to know what to do with them.

The social degradation of the latest contingent of émigrés, however, has not prevented the Cuban community in the United States from retaining the rather high status it enjoys there. Indicative of its economic standing is the fact that it has squeezed competitors out of the banana market throughout the United States and that the president of the Coca Cola company is a man of Cuban origin. In the political sphere, there is the appointment of émigrés to positions in prestigious government institutions, as advisers and even ambassadors.

The political face of the émigré organizations too is becoming more respectable. The strongarm "alphas" and "omegas" are receding into the background and reputable and seemingly charismatic personalities from the "national Cuban-American Fund" are coming to the fore. But while acquiring a more devout front the émigré community remains basically unchanged. Not only does it do its utmost to help but constantly prods official Washington to put the Cuban revolution to the test again and again.

Not far from Nacional Hotel on the Havana waterfront stands the seven-story building of the former U.S. embassy now occupied by the personnel of the Department of U.S. Interests. They of course know best of all what these interests are. But whether the American national interests coincide with the interests of a small and essentially extremist section of the Cuban colony in Florida is highly doubtful.

HAVANA

Kosovo in turmoil

Gennady Sysoyev

It has been a hot autumn in Yugoslavia, not least due to the high pitch reached by the ethnic conflict in Kosovo province

The ethnic conflict in the Kosovo autonomous province of the Republic of Serbia began in 1981 when Albanian nationalists provoked riots. More recently the situation has been further aggravated and the problem has occupied the front pages of the Yugoslav newspapers.

"Everything that is taking place in Kosovo, the political, social and moral implications of the situation, amount to the most complex problem to have faced the country to date and the most difficult test of its stability and territorial integrity. The people of Yugoslavia are not only waging a struggle for Kosovo, but also in Kosovo they are waging a struggle for Yugoslavia."

That summary of the situation by the president of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia Stipe Suvar, does not seem an overstatement.

Roots of the conflict

Why has the autonomous province of Kosovo become the nerve centre of the country and why is tension still running high?

Albanians account for 80 per cent of Kosovo's population of about two million. Nationalist feeling amongst the Albanians has led to a campaign for an "ethnically pure Kosovo." Action has been taken in that spirit as part of the campaign. Since 1981, 9 illegal organizations and over 90 Albanian nationalist groups have been uncovered in Kosovo. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against 75 thousand people on charges of anti-socialist activities.

The range of the activities of these organizations is fairly broad. They have mounted a propaganda campaign, distributing nationalist publications, and perpetrated acts of violence. Nationalist feeling is especially strong amongst students and young people. There have

been reports in Yugoslav papers of demonstrations by Albanian school students boycotting "ethnically impure schools." The tension in the region is forcing Serbians and Montenegrins to leave Kosovo.

The main reasons for the instability in Kosovo are the activities of the Albanian nationalists. Nobody is calling this into question in Yugoslavia, but clearly it is not enough to confine the problem to this. There are also economic roots to many of the problems facing Kosovo.

Kosovo is the least economically developed region of Yugoslavia. In terms of per capita gross product, it accounts for a mere 27.8 per cent of the national average. There are 224,000 people in Kosovo with jobs, but 128.5 thousand, 80 per cent of them under 30, are unemployed. In spite of the fact that the growth rate in Kosovo has lately been higher than the national average, the rift is still there.

Considerable federal funding made available to Kosovo has not led to the desired results, largely because of mistakes in allocating it. Instead of investing the money in generating jobs, the authorities have built ostentatious office blocks and carried on with an ill-conceived urbanization programme. For a long time the number of college students in Kosovo has been growing beyond the local demand for professionals. As a result there is an excess of young professionals in Kosovo, while at the same time one in six Kosovo residents over the age of 10 is illiterate.

Other mistakes have also been made. Investment in the basic industries at the expense of the processing industries has resulted in a lopsided economic structure and, worse still, isolated Kosovo's economy from the Federal economy. The desire of the leaders of Kosovo to isolate the region has exacerbated the situation, weakening ties between it and the rest of Serbia and the other republics. Insular attitudes have con-

tributed to the growth of nationalism.

The demographic factor is also aggravating the situation. Kosovo has the highest birth rate in Europe. An average family has 7 members and the birth rate among Albanians is higher than among Serbians or Montenegrins. There are important political and economic dimensions to that factor in Kosovo. Given today's birth rate, it is clearly impossible to attain a higher economic growth rate.

Tackling the knotty problems

Following the 13th congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in 1986, two special plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the League considered the problem of Kosovo in June of last year and July of this. A certain amount of progress has been made in the region, as living standards have somewhat improved and unemployment has declined. Law enforcement agencies have performed more effectively.

A detachment of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs was sent to the province in October of last year and at the moment it operates in 22 communities to assure the safety of the population.

But on the whole measures to stabilize the situation in Kosovo have been inconsistent and the situation remains tense.

The emigration of Serbians and Montenegrins continues and this is a measure of the situation in the region and around it. Since 1981, 30 thousand Serbians and Montenegrins have left, and the number of communities where there are no Serbians or Montenegrins at all is growing. Out of a total of 1,445 communities, 700 are now all-Albanian.

Rallies and demonstrations of solidarity with Serbians and Montenegrins who have left Kosovo under pressure from Albanian nationalists constitute a new development on the Yugoslav political scene. The rallies have demanded that the problem of Kosovo be resolved at an early date and amendments introduced to the Serbian Constitution to extend the powers of the Republic's government to all parts of its territory in order to consolidate Serbian unity. In the opinion of the supporters of unity, the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo should be fully integrated into Serbia rather than independent entities within the Federation.

Implications

In Yugoslavia, freedom of assembly is never encroached upon. However, the Yugoslav leadership is disturbed by the fact that constitutional rights are sometimes used to shift the foundations of the Constitution. Some of the slogans in current use aggravate ethnic tension and the situation as a whole. Riding the tide of just protests are extremist elements who have gone so far as to raise the slogans of "Death to Albanians" and "Give us Arms." The danger of these demands is understood in Yugoslavia. Nationalism is dangerous within any ethnic group, and it is impossible to combat it using its own

leadership of the autonomous province's League of Communists. This view was confirmed by the 17th Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia.

On November 17, the province committee of the Kosovo League of Communists held a plenary meeting which discussed the complicated situation in the province. The meeting relieved Kačusa Jašari from the post of the president of the Presidium of the Province Committee, and Azem Vlasi – from the post of a member of the Presidium. These decisions of the Plenary Meeting went to further aggravate the situation in Kosovo.

The dismissal of two Kosovo leaders

tee to look into demonstrators' demands.

In the meantime, the Kosovo leaders appealed for calm above all. In a television appearance, Remzi Kollgeci, president of the Kosovo Presidium, called on the demonstrators to think better of the way in which they voiced their confidence in the leadership. "We are prepared to talk with all of you," he said, "but not out in the streets."

Indeed, a street is not the best place for a dialogue. Neither are pressure and ultimatum the best means towards constructive ends. The latest developments in Priština have borne this out. Certain people tried to take advantage of the situation

in pursuance of their selfish interests. The ranks of demonstrators who sought to avoid incidents were infiltrated by separatists looking for trouble.

The S.F.R.Y. Presidium sees one-nation rallies as objectionable on the grounds that they cause public disturbances and instability, deepen international dissension, interfere with the people's normal life and work, with the functioning of government and public institutions in the region.

Against the background of Kosovo demonstrations a pre-planned meeting was held in the capital of Yugoslavia under the motto

"Brotherhood and Unity," with 1.5 million attending. That was the largest rally in the country's history. Yugoslavians declared for a closer unity of the Federation, for an early settlement in Kosovo.

The fires of the ethnic conflict are still smouldering. As the president of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, said, Kosovo is the focal point of the Yugoslav crisis, and a settlement in Kosovo could pave the nation's way out of the crisis. There is a close link between stabilization in Kosovo and stabilization in the country as a whole. Indeed, the former is impossible without the latter. That is an axiom of the current situation in Yugoslavia.



A mass meeting in Titograd, capital of Montenegro, demanded an early solution to the Kosovo problem.

Photo from monthly magazine Yugoslav News

methods. It is also understood that Albanian nationalists cannot be equated with all Albanians and that it is impossible to deal with the problem of Kosovo without the Albanians.

Judging from reports in the press, most Albanians who want peace and calm are sitting on the fence. As the weekly magazine *Komunist* points out, they should take an active stance against the nationalists. There have been such instances.

Settling the problem of Kosovo is being linked in Yugoslavia with holding the provincial leaders responsible for the aggravation of the situation. That is reasonable. Before trying to redress the situation, one should try to find out who is to blame for it. This is no idle question today. The blame for the failure to fulfil the LCY's resolutions on Kosovo goes chiefly to the

from their duties sparked off discontent and protests on the part of a considerable proportion of Kosovo's Albanian population. Tens of thousands took to the streets of Priština, the capital, demanding a revision of the Plenary Meeting's decisions.

In view of the mounting tension in Kosovo, the leaders of the province called on its people to end protest action. "You will render the greatest support to us by breaking up peacefully and going home or back to work," A. Vlasi told a demonstration. Few protesters heeded this admonition, however.

Spokesmen of the Party and state leadership of Serbia and the S.F.R.Y. arrived in Priština. Public order bodies were reinforced. The leadership of the province decided to call an extraordinary plenary meeting of the province commit-

From Kiev to Warsaw

The Soviet-Polish war of 1920 — one of the "blanks" in our history

Yanina Yezhovskaya,
Ph.D. (Hist.)

The chronicles of this war, which was never officially declared, are well known. The war is considered to have broken out in April 1920, when Marshal Jozef Pilsudski led his army to Kiev, which was taken by the Poles on May 7. But only one week later, having launched a counteroffensive, the Red Army entered ethnic Polish territory, and on August 12 appeared on the approaches to Warsaw. After many days of heavy fighting the Polish forces beat off the attack and went onto the offensive. They captured Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine. At the time Lenin wrote: "... we lacked the strength to bring the war to an end." On October 12, 1920, an armistice was signed and on March 18, 1921, a peace.

Despite the passage of the years, definite negative consequences of the war of 1920 made themselves felt in relations between the neighbouring states. More than a million people on each side had taken part in the fighting. Both sides lost tens of thousands in killed, wounded and prisoners, and suffered tremendous material losses. The tragic armed clash left a deep imprint on the history of relations between the two peoples. It affected the destinies and thinking of several generations.

Today it has become possible carefully to analyze the logic of behavior of both sides, compare the clichés formed in our minds with the historical realities and discard outdated ideas and feelings. However, it is a fact that no really systematic studies have been conducted in this field.

Preconditions

Was this dramatic episode in the history of the two neighbouring countries really inevitable? This is not a simple question.

The birth of the world's first socialist state was extremely painful. We were compelled to assert our right to existence in a fierce clash with the capitalist world. The very existence of Soviet Russia was at stake. The economy was in a state of ruin after the ordeal of the Civil War and

foreign military intervention. Instead of rehabilitating its economy, in 1920 the country was compelled to muster its forces again to defend itself, this time against an attack launched by its Western neighbour.

The Russian October revolution had enabled the Polish people to rebuild their independent and sovereign state. During that period they reunited territories that had been partitioned, established state borders and were coming to grips with extremely complex social and national problems.

Let us look into the positions on which Soviet Russia's foreign policy was based in the first few years after the revolution and the positions that governed the policies of resurgent Poland. Lenin's

countries through so-called "military aid to the workers of the world." To sum up, Trotsky's aim was at all costs to catalyze world revolution as the ultimate goal of the October Socialist Revolution.

For a long time Western historians identified the two positions and ascribed both of them to Lenin in precisely this form.

However, Lenin's real attitude towards world revolution and Poland's independence is best revealed in documents. Among these are the Decree on Peace and the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia. It was further exhibited by Soviet Russia's recognition of the Polish people's right to independent existence, the rescission of the secret treaties on the partitioning of Poland, and

MANIFEST do polskiego ludu roboczego miast i wsi. Towarzysze! Robotnicy! Włościanie!

Wieloletnia wojna wywołana przez wojnę polską, przetrwała i pod jej znakiem...
Towarzysze! Robotnicy! Włościanie!...
Wieloletnia wojna wywołana przez wojnę polską, przetrwała i pod jej znakiem...

Wieloletnia wojna wywołana przez wojnę polską, przetrwała i pod jej znakiem...
Towarzysze! Robotnicy! Włościanie!...
Wieloletnia wojna wywołana przez wojnę polską, przetrwała i pod jej znakiem...

МАНИФЕСТ к польскому городскому и сельскому рабочему люду Товарищи! Рабочие! Крестьяне!

Прошло уже много лет. Рабочий класс Польши, освобожденный от его капиталистических, помещичьих, габсбургских и австрийских гонимых, берет свою судьбу в свои собственные руки. Товарищи, рабочие и крестьяне! Силами своих собственных рук и силой рабочего класса Польши. Своими собственными руками, силой и силой...
Шесть лет тому назад, когда началась эта война, мы были обречены на поражение...
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A manifesto issued by the provisional revolutionary committee of Poland

foreign policy was already taking positive shape as a defensive policy. Efforts were being made to ensure the survival of Soviet Russia and give it a peaceful respite.

After the Brest Peace was signed, Lenin pursued a foreign policy line of transition to the prolonged peaceful development of socialism in Soviet Russia. This line was opposed by Lev Trotsky, who advanced an extremist concept of world revolution, an adventurist thesis about fomenting world revolution with the help of a "revolutionary war," and the idea of introducing revolution to other

other practical steps in pursuit of the Polish people's right to create a sovereign state. All that testified that Soviet Russia would not continue the policies of tsarism.

It is characteristic that the Polish authorities concealed from the people the Soviet government's repeated proposals to settle the relations on favourable terms and to establish frontiers advantageous to Poland.

Armed clashes actually began to take place as early as February 1919, only a few months after the rebirth of Poland. On February 5, Pilsudski, who wielded



Felix Dzerzhinsky, Feliks Kon and Julian Marchlewski, members of the provisional revolutionary committee, among workers of Bialystok in August 1920

both military and civil power at the time, concluded an agreement with the German command which was then withdrawing its forces from Lithuania and Byelorussia. As a result, Polish units began to take over these territories. Pilsudski was holding Vilnius, Brest, Luts, Minsk and Rovno. The German command was eager to provoke armed confrontation between the Polish forces and the Red Army because this diverted Poland from rendering support to an anti-German rebellion in Poznan region.

The Polish ruling circles were seeking to expand eastward. They interpreted Lenin's decree on the rescission of the secret 18th century treaties on the partitioning of Poland as the automatic restoration of the Polish state within the frontiers of that period.

As early as 1918 Pilsudski made no secret of his intention to advance eastward. He believed it would be impossible to resolve the destiny of Silesia in favour of Poland, and actually gave up the idea of achieving a satisfactory settlement on the question of Poland's western frontiers. The idea of creating a cordon sanitaire – a stretch of land isolating Poland from revolutionary Russia – and of restoring the Polish state within the frontiers of 1772 strongly appealed to his class and national interests. Pilsudski's associates made attempts to unite with Poland (as a federation or by direct subordination) Byelorussia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, the better part of the Ukraine and even the Kuban region and the Caucasus.

Roman Dmowski's right-wing Polish National Democratic Party came forward with a programme for the annexation of the whole of Lithuania, half of Latvia, a part of Northwestern Russia, almost the whole of Byelorussia, the Podol and Volyn regions, and East Galicia (the Western Ukraine).

These plans bred discord and aggression.

Pilsudski and the Entente

For many years Soviet historians were under the impression that Pilsudski started the war against Soviet Russia on the instigation of the Entente. That is why it is sometimes referred to as the Third Attack of the Entente. This is a simplification. It is now obvious that the intentions of the Polish ruling classes and the policy of the Entente, which proceeded from the position of restoring tsarist Russia, differed greatly.

The Entente urged Poland to aid the Russian White Guards. Hoping to win support for Poland's territorial claims, Ignacy Paderewski, the Polish Prime Minister, assured the Entente that his country was willing to render it. However, the Entente did not recognize Poland's claims to territories east of the so-called Curzon Line, i.e., territories that were not ethnically Polish. When Pilsudski sounded the positions of Denikin and other White generals, he saw he could not count on the creation of a federation. More than that, he could not hope to preserve the newly obtained independence of Poland. The

most he could expect was autonomy.

That was why Captain Boerner, who had been sent to conduct secret negotiations with Julian Marchlewski, the Soviet government representative, gave him to understand that it was not in Poland's interests to support Denikin's newly-launched offensive on Moscow. So everything was quiet on the line of contact between the Polish and Soviet forces. Denikin who had counted on Pilsudski's aid later said that it was precisely this that enabled the Red Army to defeat him.

However, shortly after this the Poles broke off the negotiations. On January 28, 1920, the Soviet government again proposed to renew them. It proceeded from the premise that in relations between two neighbouring states there was no problem – territorial, economic or any other – that could not be resolved peacefully. On March 1, 1920 Lenin pointed out: "...we shall never cross the line on which our troops are now stationed – and they are stationed a long way from any Polish population. We are proposing peace on this basis, because we know that this will be a tremendous acquisition for Poland. We do not want war on account of frontiers because we want to obliterate that accursed past when every Great Russian was regarded as an oppressor."

But Pilsudski and his supporters persuaded the Sejm foreign affairs committee to advance a demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops to the frontiers of 1772.

At the same time, Pilsudski evaded Wrangel's proposal for operations in pursuit of a single plan, which was submitted to him through the French mission. However, he permitted the Whites to form the Third Russian Army in Polish territory. This was a calculated move: he knew that the Soviets were not a threat to the independence of the Polish state.

Who invited whom?

In April 1920 the Polish government concluded with Simon Petlyura, a leader of the counterrevolutionary bourgeois-nationalist movement in the Ukraine, a treaty on joint military operations against Soviet Russia. As a result, the Polish forces took Kiev and had reached the left bank of the Dnieper by May.

Polish scholars are right in saying that nobody invited Pilsudski to Kiev. He simply took advantage of the difficult situation of his eastern neighbours to secure his goals. Present-day attempts to identify these aims with the interests of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Lithuanian and other peoples, and even of Poland itself, are not in the least convincing. By the second decade of the 20th century these peoples had gone through a long period of social and national development. Therefore you could not solve the destinies of these peoples using an 18th-century yardstick.

The treaty Pilsudski signed with Petlyura ("the lawful representative of the Ukrainian people") did not legalize his attack on Kiev. By then the Ukrainian people had shown their attitude to Petlyura. There was no reason whatever to regard him as their legal representative. Yes, indeed, Pilsudski intended to install Petlyura in power in the Ukraine, because the latter had promised Poland a part of Ukrainian territory. However, even in the treaty with Petlyura, Pilsudski did not mention the idea of a federation, as it was extremely unpopular. Having discarded it, Pilsudski decided to use force to reparation the territories of neighbouring peoples in his own favour.

But there is another aspect to these developments. Why did not the Red Army – the Army of a socialist state which had proclaimed its peaceful intentions – halt its advance at the ethnic boundary with Poland, after it had driven Pilsudski's army out of Soviet territory beyond the River Bug? Who invited it to forge ahead to Warsaw?

In July 1920, when the Red Army crossed the Curzon Line, which the Entente recognized as Poland's eastern frontier, the question of peace was discussed. At the time, Britain proposed that Soviet Russia sign an armistice and stop at this ethnic boundary with Poland. The Soviet government rejected Britain's offer to mediate, but stated its willingness to negotiate peace directly with Poland. It

was even prepared to withdraw from the Curzon Line in Poland's favour. However, the Warsaw government gave no reply, and the Soviet offensive continued.

In Polish territory the Red Army did not behave as a conqueror. Numerous documents convincingly show that the idea of enslaving the Polish people was totally alien to the Red Army. On August 14, on the eve of the decisive battle of the war, when the Red Army appeared at the walls of Warsaw, Lenin said that Karl Danishevski, chairman of the Russian-Ukrainian delegation to the peace talks with Poland, should be instructed to start with an official statement on

- a) independence and sovereignty;
- b) frontiers **broad**er than the Curzon Line;
- c) no reparations.

The Red Army's victory over the White Guards – the defenders of the Russian monarchy – was one of the factors that ensured the independence of resurgent Poland. The soldiers of the Red Army wished to help their class brothers. As they saw it, this was the reason for their entry into Polish territory.

Hopes, illusions...

It came as a surprise to many Soviet ideologists and strategists that, as the front line shifted towards Warsaw, the people's sympathy for the Red Army gave way to hostility. This caused grief and perplexity and prompted ideologists to explain the situation by lack of consciousness on the part of the masses, by the government's anti-Soviet propaganda, by "peasant nationalism". That was why the cliché Panskaya (Landlord) Poland appeared and the term White Poles was applied to the whole of the Polish people.

It should be mentioned that the Polish Communists had foreseen this turn of events, because they were well aware of the feeling in the country. The reason for this was not the mythical peasant nationalism, but Polish patriotism.

As the Red Army drew closer and closer to Warsaw, the Polish population feared more and more that the threat of national enslavement was coming from the East. Lenin sensed the fears of the Poles. "We know," Lenin wrote, "that it was a heinous crime to divide Poland up among German, Austrian and Russian capitalists and that this division doomed the Polish nation to long years of oppression, when the use of the native language was regarded as a crime and when the whole Polish nation was brought up in one idea, namely, to throw off this terrible yoke."

At the Ninth All-Russian Conference of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) eyewitnesses confirmed the fact that neither the Polish peasants nor the Polish workers supported the Red Army. Dmitry Poluyan, a member of the re-

volutionary military council of the Fifteenth Army of the Western Front, said: "In the Polish Army the national idea welded the capitalist, the peasant and the worker together, and this was manifest everywhere."

Many Soviet leaders and military commanders of that time did not expect that all Poles, including working people, would rally against the Red Army, which had approached Warsaw as a result of hostilities provoked by an attack on Kiev. But, in fact, such a reaction could be foreseen. This can be explained, in particular, by the inability of Soviet leaders and Red Army commanders to assess the situation properly, to foresee the consequences of the more than century-old oppression of the Polish people and inadequate respect for their national feelings.

They also took it for granted that the Polish working people who, together with the other peoples of Russia, had formed a firm revolutionary alliance to fight tsarism, were now ready to carry out a social revolution. Proceeding from this, they were convinced that it was possible in practice to pool the working people's efforts to launch a world revolution. They were simply blinded by such prospects.

During the first difficult period, when the Soviet state was just being established, the hopes for world revolution were largely identified with hopes for international aid and support of Soviet efforts. Two hundred thousand Poles, together with other internationalist fighters, took part in the October revolution and helped establish the world's first Soviet republic. However, the hopes for an early development of the revolutionary process in Poland were not justified. Neither a Polish nor a world revolution took place. More than that, as a result of a miscalculation, the Polish working-class movement was seriously weakened and confidence in Communists in Poland was badly undermined.

During subsequent decades the memories of the war embittered Soviet-Polish relations. It proved difficult to improve them. The old anti-Russian feeling that had developed under tsarist autocracy did not disappear in Poland. Far from it, it solidified and became a distinguishing feature of Poland's relations with the neighbouring socialist state. Anti-Sovietism formed the basis of all Polish policies. The idea about the Polish threat was in turn embedded in the minds of Soviet people. Contrary to the actual situation, the Soviet people really believed that the peaceful respite was of a temporary character and that they should be ready at all times for new attacks. The grave consequences of mutual prejudice and hostility are well known. Addressing an audience at the Sejm in Warsaw last summer, Mikhail Gorbachev said:

"If it had not been for the war of 1920, which was dramatic for both sides, if the Polish-Soviet relations had been different from those that took shape in practice during the interwar period, who knows how the destinies of Europe would have developed later."

JUNIOR WORLD

“I like your articles very much,” wrote E.K. from Ivano-Frankovsk, “but the one entitled ‘Don’t teach me how to live’ staggered me with its absurdity. ‘Don’t tell your children stealing is immoral, just don’t steal yourself’... How about cases where parents and grandparents are impeccably honest and yet their children, influenced elsewhere or for some inner motive, start stealing things and money from the home? How should the parents react? Just by ‘not stealing themselves’? What if their son takes to drinking and their daughter to prostitution? Did you really mean to say that a teacher should not inform parents that their daughter uses four-letter words in a literature class or that their son is so drunk he can hardly stand in the gymnasium? What if the parents themselves are well aware of their children’s conduct? Shouldn’t they set the children in the right direction? Of course they should, but how? According to you, parents must set an example, i.e., a mother should not be a prostitute or a father an alcoholic?”


First, I’d like to commend the pedagogical skill of the author of the letter – he started with praise. That’s what I always ask editors: say a few kind words about my article before, if necessary, slating it. I’ll go and rewrite it without making any objection. But praise first, otherwise the response will be quite different: “You haven’t understood a word of what I’ve written!”

Children are especially responsive to praise. They need it as they need air. And we are always so conscious of excessive praise. But for one overpraised child there are always a hundred who have never had enough of it, and we are afraid of meeting their grim faces in the dark.

Now let’s pass over to the substance of the letter. The first thing I’d like to note is that my correspondent challenges me to start an age-old discussion anew.

I know a good many will find the letter just. Can’t we really control our own children? Shall we let them go on stealing and drinking?

We fail to notice that a very subtle and therefore dangerous change of meaning is taking place here. What matters is not



Antidote or poison?

our words, but the result. Our psychology is simple: if I don’t reproach my son, he will go on drinking and stealing; but if I **do** – will he ever stop?

In most cases, unfortunately, the words don’t have the desired effect even if repeated a thousand times, since human speech is not meant for scolding, but for uplifting our fellowmen. When I lecture or reproach someone, it’s myself I’m deceiving. I believe in the magic powers of my words (once I’ve said them, the kid stops stealing). But these powers are non-existent. I speak righteous words more for my own salvation, so that no one (even my conscience) can accuse me of closing my eyes to evil.

Neither boys nor girls will use foul language before a good and respected teacher. But if a teacher lacks moral force and authority, a denunciation (or complaint) to the parents is a poor compensation for the deficiency. So I simply need not trouble myself about the reasons for my pupils’ bad conduct; everything is much simpler: I subdue, I reproach, I punish, I complain...

All the examples cited in the letter are of one kind: it’s too late to do anything.

We are often guided by the false assumption that pedagogics are omnipotent. Medical science knows incurable diseases, whereas pedagogics is not allowed to have any. However, education does know a host of AIDS-size problems. Pedagogics does not have an answer to what to do with a young prostitute, or a child who steals. It does not have miraculous methods of correction. I beg of you, don’t trust those who say that such methods exist. Even Makarenko, who possessed the most powerful

means of correction – a collective – had his setbacks. Pedagogics is the science of imbuing children with humanism. But if the human element in a child is killed, by a wrong example or a cruel word, that’s that, and there is no point alarming each other with horrible stories. Why put your faith in empty, impotent words? “You’d better speak to her,” says a teacher to parents, but no one knows what it means. And the father – if there is a father – just gives his child a good thrashing.

Actually, the real situation is quite different. First, the parents drive the daughter from the home with their incessant nagging, and when the girl finally gets into trouble, they start crowing: “There you are! Didn’t I tell you,” shouts the mother – Didn’t I warn you, you slut!” The familiar situation is shown in the film-blockbuster “Little Vera” with surgical, rather than artistic precision.

Bad examples are there for everyone, yet some children follow them, and some do not. Why? Evidently because the plight described in the letter is not a result of connivance, as the author of the letter and many others tend to think, but of the **loss of any meaning in life**. The kid has lost his bearings; can’t we help find the way by lecturing and scolding? Perhaps what we think to be an antidote is really another injection of the lethal poison?

Again comes the old argument: reproofs, reprimands, scolding, punishment – is it poison or antidote?

And one more thing... Perhaps some of those who become prostitutes, drink and steal are far more wholesome persons than we are, my esteemed reader E.K. We are not the ones to sit on judgement. I implore you not to say I have praised stealing and drinking. Far from it.

Simon Soloveichik

Repercussions of the Volga cruise

From our special correspondent
Irina Lagunina

Enough time has already passed since the cruise for early letters to have arrived from our new friends in the U.S.A., Denmark, the F.R.G. and Sweden — people I met during the cruise. "For peace, security and environment protection." I have become aware of how difficult it is to assess the length of the route from Kazan to Rostov-on-Don not in "Volga miles," but in terms of useful human communication per unit of time.

When the cruise started I tried to seek out the more interesting people for interviews. This was no easy task considering that there were about 200 participants. When I drew up my list I showed it to Vagan Gevorgyan of the journal "U.S.A. Economics, Politics, Ideology." His list and mine coincided. So we took most of the interviews together.

Let's talk about the North Atlantic...

J.C. Johansen, the bearded, pipe-smoking leader of the Danish delegation, goes by the nickname Skipper. While everyone was arguing what panels to set up and what the procedure for them should be, he exchanged a few quiet remarks with the members of the forum, then produced a sheet of paper and wrote, Discussion group: "Ecological consequences of naval presence in the North Atlantic." He put it up on the noticeboard.

"I bet you're a seaman," Vagan and I said almost in chorus, as we began our interview.

"You're right. I'm retired master mariner. I spent 35 years in the high seas. Why did I decide to set up a discussion group on this particular problem? It's a long story. You see, in my opinion Denmark and Norway adopted a wrong policy when they became members of NATO. I was quite young in those days and I probably didn't understand the full consequences of it. Initially I more or less accepted it, believing it was a sort of defence system. But as it went on I saw that it could lead to very unhappy consequences for my country. Unfortunately, I un-

derstood that too late and the only thing I could do was become involved in the anti-war movement... To my mind the arms race between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the North Atlantic provides many dramatic examples. It seems to me that the structure of the U.S. naval command does not rule out the possibility of a missile with a nuclear warhead being launched, say, from a submarine, by mistake.

"Do you think your movement can be a success?" asked Vagan.

"I hope it will. You see, the U.S. armed forces can exist in the North Atlantic as long as they have bases on our territories. If we refuse to give them the opportunity to have these bases they will have to pull away from our coasts; they wouldn't be able to operate as close to as they do at the moment. This can be done because some of the agreements permitting American bases on our territories are not connected with NATO and have been signed on a bilateral basis. Through these agreements our countries have been made a springboard for a naval incursion into the Baltic Sea," Johansen went on. "Is that defensive policy? I think the six proposals put forward by Mikhail Gorbachev in his Murmansk speech can provide a good starting point for a dialogue. I see nothing in these six proposals that could not be implemented. Unfortunately, only two of our newspapers published the full text of the speech, so many Danes are not familiar with your position."

"Whose naval presence in the North Atlantic worries you most?" asked Vagan.

"That of the U.S., of course, because it involves bases on our territory. But I can't say we're happy about the presence of the Soviet Navy. In the event of a nuclear conflict we would be destroyed by both sides."

"Nevertheless, you stress the ecological, and not the military or political aspects of the naval presence off Danish shores," I observed.

"Yes, many people are unaware that there are two dangers in our region — military, and ecological. The naval forces are to blame for both. Approximately 540 nuclear reactors are sailing the ocean today. We know that marine accidents are not that rare. In the last 20 years eleven ships have sunk in the Atlantic. Not all

of them carried nuclear reactors or warheads. But from my data, some did. And how many nuclear reactors can we allow to go to the bottom of the sea? There's nothing you can do about them. Sooner or later radioactive substances will leak into the ocean. This is already happening and you can't impose a moratorium on radiation as on nuclear explosions."

"Speaking of nuclear testing," I interrupted. "During this cruise we've often heard it suggested that the Soviet Union could extend a moratorium or renew it and that such a move would enhance its international authority. Such calls were made at the recent international meeting in Glasgow. Vagan, do you think it's fair suggestion?"

"No, I don't. Any unilateral measure is good only up to a point, beyond which it can be destructive. Only experts can determine the limits. But the American expert Gene La Rocque believes the U.S. has carried out many more underground explosions than we have. I think the best way to tackle these questions is through the patient and persistent negotiation that is proving so useful."

"But to go back to the problems of the North Atlantic," I turned to Johansen again.

"All human life depends on the oceans," the old skipper went on, his manner indicating that the remarks Vagan and I had exchanged didn't greatly interest him. "The oceans are already calling for help. When I was a boy, our family lived in a village near Copenhagen. I enjoyed eating the fried fish they sold on the coast. Now I wouldn't buy this fish, and anyway there are no fish there. And if there are no fish it means that the conditions for them aren't there anymore."

Skipper Johansen put his signature to the call for a ban on radiological weapons adopted by the forum.



...and about the Volga...

The Volga was so wide we couldn't see the banks. And anyway we didn't have much time for sight-seeing: we stopped at cities along the river by day and travelled by night. The members of the ecological forum were dismayed that they wouldn't be able to see the Volga, let alone become aware of that river's ecological problems. Our programme, however, included a visit to the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences' Institute of the Ecology of the Volga Basin in the city of Togliatti.

"What concrete contribution can your Institute make?" director Stanislav Konovalov was asked by one of those present.

"We can analyze the ecological situation anywhere. But our conclusions have no force in law."

"In that case, what's the use of your efforts?"

"Recently we succeeded in having a plan to build a nuclear power plant near our city scrapped. This is only one instance."

After an improvised press conference we approached Konovalov and invited him to come aboard our cruise ship the Maxim Gorky. The conversation continued there.

"As someone who lives on the Volga, how do you feel about the building of hydropower stations?"

"At present our study of hydropower stations is aimed mainly at justifying their existence. It's the same all over the world. There is practically no information on the losses we sustain. Nobody wants to finance a study of the negative factors, as there are too many vested interests. But it can already be said with certainty that hydropower stations should not be built in valleys. In addition to inundating valuable fertile land, we lose the surrounding area and the river. The water table level rises and soil is salinized." This alone should caution us against pressing ahead with the building of power stations."

"You are not in favour of nuclear energy either?"

"I think we should make the most of renewable sources of energy, so-called bio-conversion, solar or wind energy. A lot more study into that is needed." Many wastes produce methane when they decompose. It shouldn't be just dumped. This is especially important

for small towns and rural areas."

"Is the use of these alternative sources of energy a realistic proposition in the Soviet Union?"

"I hope so. But not in the immediate future. For too long the nuclear lobby would not allow money to be spent on studying renewable sources of energy. But I am convinced that it is a realistic idea. I have made a study of California, a major industrial area in the United States. I found

over 30 years). They failed to provide an answer. In short, they preferred to abandon the project."

But what of places like the Crimea where energy is needed, but a nuclear power plant doesn't seem to be the best answer all the same?

On the eve of our arrival in Togliatti, the local authorities had held a meeting with public representatives. The citizens proposed plans to build several chemical plants. Konovalov's institute backed these demands.

...and about ourselves

"Hello, my name's Bob Woodward. I'm a journalist and a sceptic," said a small man in shorts as we shook hands. "I hear you wanted to interview me. I'm ready."

Once again Vaga and I sat down to take an interview. "Like so many Americans," says Woodward, "I have some preconceived beliefs about your country and your people. I have discovered during this short period that the country

is beautiful and the people are incredibly friendly and warm. When I come back home I will develop the pictures - I was a photo journalist before I became the owner of several newspapers and radio companies. I am looking forward to returning and developing the pictures I've taken - and putting into words as best I can what this experience has meant to me. I'm not very young, but it is only here in Russia, in Volgograd, that I have understood what a terrible time the Soviet people had during the war."

In Volgograd there was a marked change of mood. The weather was better, the sun warmer and relations between those on the cruise were more relaxed. Perhaps even more important was the fact that we were visiting the scene of the most tragic and heroic events in Soviet history. Be that as it may, after Volgograd everything was different. Woodward told me that despite the local people's complaints about the pollution of the Volga (see New Times No. 41, 1988, Glasnost) he found that our "water artery" was cleaner than the Mississippi, where it comes from.

A middle-aged lady from the American group (the biggest of the seven delegations to the forum, it comprised 5



A hearty welcome

Photo by V. Dvorzhetsky

to my surprise that wind energy accounts for 10 per cent of the power consumed. I don't think the winds in this country are weaker."

I remember that it occurred to me at the time that it was the total absence of ecological thinking and not just the "nuclear lobby" that was to blame. For years ecologists have trailed behind physicists and chemists trying, god knows why, to prove that their inventions were harmless. It is time the roles were reversed.

I managed to put in a word in the heated argument that the director's reply provoked between an ecologist and a physicist travelling on our ship.

"You said that you succeeded in bringing about a ban on the building of a nuclear power plant. I think the main purpose of our being here is to exchange useful experience in our battles for a cleaner environment. Could you share your experience?"

"In the case of the nuclear power plant, things were relatively simple. We inquired about prospective users of the energy and were startled to learn that there was none. We also asked the institute that was designing the plant to give us the collective dose (the degree of radioactive contamination in the event of accident

people) who took part in the Social Problems panel confided to me that she belonged to a risk group because her father was an alcoholic.

"You know, only a few years ago I would have been ashamed to say this, but I am saying it quite easily now: the mentality of Americans has changed, so many people today need help because their parents abused alcohol."

"We could do with a similar change of mentality in this country," I thought.

"As a journalist, you should try to do all you can to prevent your country from making the same mistake as we made with our Prohibition. We found that nothing good can come from forced measures," she tried to convince me.

To go back to Volgograd. In the evening, after a visit to the War Memorial, a sight-seeing tour of the city and a meeting with the local citizens, several of our guests, who had apparently read Vasili Grossman before coming to the U.S.S.R., asked to be shown the Wall of General Rodimtsev, which was not part of our itinerary.

We took them to the bank of the Volga and showed them the masonry with the inscription in blood: "We are dying but not surrendering." From there we went to the Museum, which showed a panorama of the Battle of Stalingrad, to see the portrait of the legendary general. We went around the panorama several times but we didn't find as much as a small photograph, not to speak of a portrait. We decided to ask the woman attendant at the museum.

"Yes, there is a photograph," said Anna Goldatova, an elderly woman. She showed us a small group photograph and helped us identify General Rodimtsev. Unfortunately, this is the only photograph we have. Rodimtsev doesn't qualify for a portrait — we only have portraits of those with the rank of army general and higher." One sensed that the words jarred on her own ear. "I took part in the Battle of Stalingrad myself and have written a book about it. Many Stalingrad veterans have published their memoirs. We thought that maybe we could use part of the royalties to order a portrait of Rodimtsev. You are not the only ones to ask about Rodimtsev, especially now, after the publication of Grossman's novel *Life and Destiny*."

It was late evening when we returned to our ship. The Maxim Gorky smells of watermelons and vobla (Caspian roach). The caterers are a cooperative enterprise (this was the first self-financing cruise, the sponsors on the Soviet side being the cooperatives Ecology and Contour. Our guests named the dry, smoked fish "smoked mermaid," partly I think because somebody had explained to them that vobla in the vernacular can also mean "a skinny woman."

I talked to Donald Kalsched, a clinical psychologist from New York.

"Volgograd has upset some of my deep-seated beliefs," Don said pensively. "I have become even more convinced that overcoming the enemy image is above all a psychological problem. I myself felt tears in my eyes when I saw the Memorial to the martyrdom and suffering with which your people paid for their freedom, dignity and great present."

"I wish my father could see all this. He is a very conservative man and I know some of you think he was a member of the John Birch Society. He was not, but he was sympathetic to the society. My father, like many other Americans, hears what he hears about the Soviet Union through the American press and on television. Generally, the American press is quite fair in its presentation. I'm not saying our press distorts things intentionally for the government and trying to mislead Americans about the Soviet Union. I think most of our journalists are themselves victims of misconceptions and false stereotypes."

"I am a psychologist," Don went on, "and I'm interested in how the images of good and evil are formed in the human mind, and what visual symbols accompany these ideas. Man has a tendency to personify everything. If we look at the history of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, let's say newspaper drawings and cartoons, we find two ever-present tendencies. On the one hand, there are the idealized notions of each other that inspire hope for cooperation. On the other, there are attempts to invest each other with demonic features. Sometimes I feel that people need an image of an enemy to ascribe their own vices to."

"But in a world full of nuclear bombs there is no room for old stereotypes," he continued. "Incidentally, I have watched my own stereotypes about the Soviet people and its history bursting like soap bubbles during the Volga cruise. Before the cruise, like many of my colleagues, I believed that after the Second World War, the U.S., full of the best intentions with regard to the Soviet Union, was more than friendly and hoped for cooperation. However, Stalin's postwar policies, for example, keeping Soviet troops in Eastern Europe and similar actions, disappointed Americans. Our press told us that the Soviet Union was to blame for the cold war. It's only now that I have got rid of these beliefs."

The "constructive" part

Towards the end of the cruise, Bob Woodward approached me and said:

"I've decided that when I get home, I'll try to recruit our Representative Tom Tauke and Senator Charles Grassley, both of whom I know personally, and per-

suaide them to come on a peace cruise in the future, so that they can begin to understand the Soviet Union and the Soviet people on a personal basis, and then tell their colleagues. I'm sure that then they'll use very different words about your country than they do today, words that will express the warmth we have experienced here."

Everybody wished that the rapport that had emerged during the ten days of the cruise could somehow be conveyed to other people and influence our relations in the future.

John Shark, professor of psychology from Bowling Green University, gave the Soviet Peace Committee a list of more than 250 American nongovernment organizations willing to cooperate with the Soviet Union.

"Here, during the cruise, I learned that cooperatives in the U.S.S.R. now have the right of access to the international arena. This is wonderful," he said. "Do you have a list of these cooperatives? No? You must make such a list."

I agree, and I'm sure such a catalogue will be compiled soon and that it will be of great help in promoting citizen diplomacy.

"We have also agreed to exchange videocassettes and represent a full range of everyday activities in the United States and in the U.S.S.R., activities such as classroom sessions in our schools and universities and family gatherings. We will send these cassettes to the Moscow Library of Foreign Literature. These examples are only a few of the "specific projects."

There is an old tale about a teacher who summoned a pupil, drew a straight line on the sand and said: "Destroy it without moving the sand and without erasing the line." The pupil thought and drew another, longer line parallel to the first one.

In Soviet-American relations one can already discern the line drawn by new thinking, the recent meetings and agreements that have given a boost to citizen diplomacy. This line is now more pronounced, but the line left by the cold war and stagnation in international relations also makes itself felt. What will the relationship between these lines be by the beginning of new year and the next decade? One hopes that the old line will be shorter than the new one.

Why a chair full of nails?

Avant-garde and society. Re a symposium.

Anatoly Gorelov,
Cand. Sc. (Philosophy)

Perestroika has brought us nearer to a vast continent of modern culture, the hazy contours of which we formerly either eagerly sought on the horizon or shunned, foaming at the mouth at its inhabitants and creators. That continent is avant-garde art.

True, we are exploring it at a time when in some arts, for instance, in architecture, modernism has already given way to postmodernism, but better late than never. True, we were allowed glimpses of modernist works of art, at, say, the Moscow-Paris and Modern U.S. Art Exhibitions. We heard how Khrushchev fulminated against Ernst Neizvestny's "freaks" in the Manege and stood in long queues on Malaya Gruzinskaya, where our avant-garde artists found their haven after the notorious "bulldozer attack."

Today, perhaps for the first time, we can see modernism in its entirety. A host of events has come down on us — the Günter Uecker and Francis Bacon exhibitions in the Central House of Artists accompanied by showings of avant-garde films made in the 1920s. And audiences, who have seen only some Soviet films and some by Charlie Chaplin of the period discover a new, original and captivating cinema. In the conference hall foreign guests deliver lectures about avant-garde painting and arrange a symposium "Art and society. On the reception of modernist art." Soviet theatres stage classic plays of the Theatre of the Absurd: "The Bald Prima Donna" and "The Chairs" by Eugene Ionesco, "Waiting for Godot" and "Krapp's Last Tape" by Samuel Beckett.

Avant-garde and society. The two notions seem poles apart. Neizvestny's freaks, Uecker's nail-studded chairs, or Bacon's formless beastlike creatures with disfigured heads or completely headless — what have they to do with reality? Isn't modernist art just escapism into the world of hair-raising phantasmagorias? Yet supposing reality itself evokes an urge to escape from it? And

some artists just feel it more keenly and give vent to it on their canvases? Can it be that the avant-garde is somehow linked with real life after all?

So what is the avant-garde and what is its role in modern world? Why do we need chairs stuck full of nails and headless hulks on canvases? We do not even know that we were not trailblazers in our rejection and harassment of modernist art, and that many thinkers, in our country, in particular, outstripped us. Thus, Hans Sedlmayr in his book "Loss of Balance" correlated expressionism with depression, futurism with mania, cubism and constructivism with loss of a sense of reality, surrealism with schizophrenia. Back in the early 1920s Nikolai Berdyaev wrote: "In modern art the creative act is becoming disintegrated... Profound shock and the dissection of human forms, the annihilation of the full human image, the rift with nature — are all inherent in the new trends... Objects, lamps, settees, streets penetrate man, disrupting the integrity of his self, his image, his distinctive personality... In Picasso's work we follow the process of disjunction, the cubist slicing of whole human forms, their disconnection so as to probe deeper in the search for the primordial corpuscles that make up man. Renaissance art perceived man as an entity. It (Picasso's work) no longer seeks a harmonious man, his art has lost the ability to perceive things in their entirety, it strips away layer after layer in order to get at the inner striving of the natural creature, it penetrates ever deeper only to discover the images of the veritable monsters that Picasso conveys so forcefully and colourfully."

The same applies, in even greater measure, to abstractionism, theatre of the absurd, serialist music. For all that, avant-garde has been here throughout the 20th century and if it is a departure from the mainstream of art then probably similar

deviations exist in real life? Or else what are we to do with the classic postulate — being determines consciousness?

Eisenstein's "The Battleship Potemkin," the true story of one of the critical moments of Russian history, deeply impressed Francis Bacon and greatly influenced his work, and much of Günter Uecker's work is prompted by the tragedy of WWII and the arms race. Probably a key to unravelling avant-garde lies in a closer scrutiny of the life around us. What is there that it was so out of the ordinary as to bring forth so unusual a trend in art? Two world wars that carried away thousands of lives, civil and local wars, totalitarian regimes that claimed ever more lives in peacetime. Mankind is on the brink of self-destruction and that accounts for the way avant-garde art sees the world.

In modernism art has found figurative ways to convey the split in man and in the world around him. Absurdities on the stage and on canvas merely hold up a mirror to the absurdities of real life. Modernism often seems incoherent and provocative, but that only goes to show that most people are not aware that they live in an absurd world which art tries to depict adequately.

As social control structures grow increasingly complex, man and culture tend to become simpler and simpler. But this is not that wholesome simplicity that does away with all that is superfluous and alien — on the contrary, it eliminates the diversity, vital to man and civilization. Hence the protesting formalist art which often looks unintelligible precisely because it stands out against the background of the emasculated content of life and art. Ideology brings such pressure to bear on art that the latter takes to formalism in order to uphold its right to independence and sincerity. This strikes the eye in totalitarian states, where ideol

ogy holds back art with a critical edge, and is blurred in democratic societies where ideology is more flexible. But art's attempts to find refuge in formalistic devices are futile – ideology, by combating formalism in art, tries to induce art to serve ideological ends.

20th-century art, and culture as a whole, for that matter, are extremely irrational.

Abstractionism has ultimately come to reject not only abstract rationalism but reason as such, and that is a perilous course. The content of art is not necessarily to be directly depicted, say, in concrete images in painting. On canvas it can be conveyed by colour, line or space, but it must be here, for any creative work worthy of the name is a unity of form and content, of spirit and soul.

Modern culture cannot but be split since it reflects a split in man and is created by split personalities. Its very subdivision into such isolated spheres as science, technology, art, philosophy and their subsequent fractionalizing points to the split. Over the last few centuries great cultural figures were deeply troubled by the differentiation of culture and insistently called for a broad cultural synthesis. But insofar as man is split, the synthesis is unfeasible. More, the splitting processes continue – it is enough to recall the disputes between “physicists” and “lyricists” in this country.

The link between the split personality and the overall cultural split is most easily traceable in art. “With the emergence of the impressionists, the balance between the data provided by our senses and the laws of logic was completely disrupted,” Roger Garaudy wrote in his famous book “On Realism without Shores.” It is not for nothing that late-19th-century art came to be known as decadent. Insofar as it portrayed a degraded life, art grew decadent from within. Futurism and other artistic trends of the early 20th century were conceived as a counterweight to decadence but were decadent as well.

Modernism rejects the notion of a stable and rational world structure. But it builds a new world by trial and error, for no cornerstone exists to base their work on, and the force of their creativity is not on its own enough to work wonders.

To understand modernism we should describe it as a peculiar reaction of finely organized and highly sensitive people to the phenomena that endanger the human species and that formerly did not exist on

our planet. This is an unusual reply to an unprecedented challenge. And the cause should not be ignored in speaking of the consequences. When “Little Vera” was given its first night at the Moscow Cinema House someone asked from the hall: “Why show that?” “Why live like that?” another viewer retorted. But modernism, you may object, is a distorting mirror. What do we need it for?

Since modernism came into being, the public have been apprehensive of modernism and of its predecessors, impressionism and postimpressionism, which now seem nothing short of classic. The philistine always shuns the new and unconventional. Man resists when anything new and disturbing tries


to enter his consciousness. A true artist is always lonely in his work; he defies the torpid majority which in its turn ostracizes him. This is vividly shown in “Lust for Life,” the film about van Gogh. Some time has to pass before people become aware that the artist, dissociating himself, as it were, from the visible world, creates the spiritual primary materials for people to build their personalities from. And if the artist is talented, he ultimately wins recognition and, what is most important, understanding.

This task is very difficult for modernism by virtue of its unconventionality and, moreover, in a society where everything that does not cater to the primitive tastes of the rulers is banned.

Culture and free creative work as such are taboo because they open up new vistas and help form personalities. And free-thinking individuals present the greatest danger to authoritarian regimes, for there only one personality – that of the ruler – is permitted to exist. Paradoxical though it may seem, that is impossible, for dialogue is needed to shape a personality. The period of terror that we euphemistically call the personality cult was in effect a nonentity cult, time when even the slightest trace of individuality was ruthlessly exterminated.

Regrettably, at the symposium “Art and society. On the reception of modernist art,” the participants, which included West German journalist Hans Peter Riese, art expert and exhibition sponsor Germano Celant (Italy), art theoretician Pierre Restany (France) and Soviet film director Alexander Mitta and art critic A. Plakhov, paid too much attention to the question of whether our avant-garde lagged behind the West – as if in art, as in sports, you can win or lose. To my mind, it would have been better if they'd concentrated on how to get our public to recognize and know the avant-garde, which presumably will now take an ever greater place in our life. If this problem is solved, it will take care of the preservation of the avant-garde in our country, a problem of which Alexander Mitta spoke with great concern.

And so, let us learn to understand modernist art no matter how ridiculous and useless it may seem at first glance, lest we should find ourselves on Uecker's nail-studded chair or turn into one of Bacon's headless monsters.



Drawing by Garif Basyrov

In search for melancholy baby

America as seen by a Russian émigré writer

What's our idea of America, a country which arouses such mixed feelings? How true is this idea to reality? The author seeks the answers in both fiction and non-fiction.

Late last year the book "In Search for Melancholy Baby" by Vassily Aksyonov was published abroad in Russian and English at the same time. The author of "The Ticket to the Stars" and "Surpassed Barrelware," Aksyonov ranked prominently in the "generation of the sixties" who wrote what was referred to then as youth or confessional prose.

At the end of the seventies, Aksyonov lost all hope of ever getting his writings published at home, and on the eve of the Moscow Olympics he was allowed out of the country. Having roamed about Western Europe for a while, he finally settled in the United States to become one of the most prolific writers of the "third Russian emigration."

Reminiscent of the first line of a song, popular in the fifties, from the movie "The Roaring Twenties," the name of his latest book had a pensively nostalgic ring to it. By the search for melancholy baby the author meant rooting about in his memory for his initial notions of the trans-oceanic land and matching those hazy visions against the first-hand impressions and experiences he had gained over his "American years."

Aksyonov had written about America before. His lengthy feature entitled "Twenty-Four Hours Non-Stop" appeared in *Novy Mir* in summer 1976 but, as far as I remember, passed practically unnoticed then.

Following in the footsteps of the authors of "One-Storeyed America" and of Viktor Nekrasov, "a tourist with a cane," whose travelogue "On the Either Side of the Atlantic" had come under devastating fire from literary critics, Aksyonov took a step away, perhaps, from the beaten track – and stopped at that. The next attempt was made a decade-odd later; over most of this period the author obtained as much "inside knowledge" of his

subject as Biblical Jonas had of the whale's entrails.

This time Aksyonov attempted a more fundamental and multidimensional task which was not only to put down his impressions in travelogue form but to interlay them with reflections and reminiscences and, as a result, to put together what he described as "a strange, incredibly idealized, mutilated but amazingly authentic image of America." Let's see just how authentic it has turned out to be.

Fiction and facts

The author has taken special pains to smash stereotyped notions of America – both complimentary and negative, official and "folk." The melodramatic story told by the prewar Soviet movie "The Circus" largely accounts for our man in the street tending to regard all the non-white Americans as victims of national and racial bias. This is especially true of the Black Americans. In accordance with our stereotype of the black man, Aksyonov writes, they can never be wicked, stupid, treacherous – anything but **oppressed**. At the age of 19, Anton Chekhov was already sober-minded and shrewd enough to take an ironic view of his little brother Misha's having taken "Uncle Tom's Cabin" too literally. "Madam Beecher Stowe has moved him to tears," he commented. Even a century later, however, those whom Aksyonov describes as critically-minded individuals still bring this stereotype to America and long hang on to it until reality beats it out of them like dust.

Another stereotyped notion, still more tenacious and current among men of letters who readily use it in their writings, is that of the West being a modern Sodom and Gomorrah. We have always taken it for granted, Aksyonov remarks, that decadent Western civilization is the root of all evil: lechery, drug-addiction, sexual perversions. Although this statement might sound overly categorical, it

can easily be corroborated by examples. Take any novel, set in the West, by a leading contemporary Soviet author – "Insomnia" by Alexander Kron, "The Choice" by Yuri Bondarev or "Looking Ahead" by Vassily Below. In these novels, Paris is inevitably identified with strip tease and porno films; New York with burlesque; Stockholm with sex shops and sex shows. Having found themselves abroad, their characters somehow make a point of visiting shadier places of entertainment – only to come up afterwards with wrathful tirades against "depravity" which is implied to be total. It would seem that a permissive society like this should long have plunged into a solid licentious orgy, Aksyonov observes, but actually there isn't much lechery in sight...

Having got rid of certain naive preconceived notions, Soviet emigrants promptly get into a rather awkward predicament. The thing is, Aksyonov admits, that while in the U.S.S.R. they automatically dismiss criticisms of certain aspects of American life as so much nonsense and therefore feel bitterly disappointed upon getting to America. There is no denying the fact that what many of our journalists specializing in international affairs have to say about the capitalist West ought to be taken with a pinch of salt, and the years of perestroika haven't improved the situation much. But then the "critically-minded individuals" do not have to rely solely on all sorts of distorting mirrors for information, they can always get it straight from the horse's mouth – i.e., from foreign (specifically, American) fiction.

That the U.S. has never been a land of milk and honey can be gathered from such novels as "Capital" and "The Jungle" by Upton Sinclair, "The Grapes of Wrath" by John Steinbeck and "Tucker's People" by Ira Wolfert. One can argue that the situation has changed since the long-gone time of their writing. That is right, but now there have arisen new problems and new social ills as evidenced, again, by fiction: the novels like "Fat City" by Leonard Gardner, "A Hall of Mirrors" by Robert Stone, "Earthly Possessions" and "Dinner at the Homesick Restaurant" by Ann Tyler. All these books date back to the seventies and the early eighties, all of them have been translated into Russian precisely with a view to giving us a more adequate idea of the United States. This may sound naive but I think that anyone who has read these novels is

guaranteed immunity against the stupor which Aksyonov, for one, has been locked into by the sight of desolation in, say, the South Bronx, eastern Washington, or any other place.

The reason why generations of our contemporaries have had mistaken notions of the postwar reality in the United States lies, to a no small extent, in their ignoring Russian translations of American fiction as a mirror of that reality. Significantly, the images of that country pictured in some of our youngsters in the early fifties (as reminisced by Aksyonov) and now (as described by the young prose writer Alexei Grigorenko in his story "Plans for October" in the *Literaturnaya Uchoba* magazine has carried recently) coincide almost completely. In 1952 Aksyonov, a 19-year-old provincial from Kazan, got to a party thrown by "a circle of Moscow Americophiles."

He saw Bing Crosby, Nat "King" Cole and Louis Armstrong records; American-style clothes, Camel and Pall Mall cigarettes, words like "baby", "darling" and "pink" – all these attributes of the then current craze for things American were very much in evidence there.

What Alexei Grigorenko describes a third of a century later looks like the same party except for the equipment it uses and the kind of music it thrills to. The modern

radiograms and cumbersome open-reel tape recorders have given way to exotic stereo cassette decks, tuners, turntables and equalizer amplifiers; and Crosby's crooning – to Janis Joplin's ecstatic outcries, to the pulsating rhythms of the Creedence, Rolling Stones, Jefferson Airplane rock groups. The young people described by Aksyonov and Grigorenko have a great deal in common not only their Americanized manners and tastes, but also their notion of America as a land of the unrestrained, the unruly even. In his late teens, Vassily Aksyonov came to associate the very word "America" with rude stares, booming voices and lewd grins. Since then, the image has survived in the minds of our people at large, younger ones especially, almost intact to this day.

Such a "traditional" view of America ignores practically the entire spectrum of moral and spiritual values which have

long been underlying America's everyday life and national literature. In the fifties, for instance, many Americans' yearning for self-cognition and self-improvement, their proneness to introspection, and their puritanical determination to resist temptations could not be duly appreciated here if only because of the scarcity of the information we had; besides, even whatever little came to our knowledge was tendentiously misinterpreted. Since then, however, enough works of American fiction have been



Drawing by Maria Ryzhikova

translated into Russian to offer all those concerned a weighty counterbalance to both propaganda "horror stories" and to "non-official" legends which, in their turn, are often biased and one-sided.

Amateurs and professionals

In his judgements about today's America, about the specific features of its culture in a broad sense of the word Vassily Aksyonov, although well-read and impressionable, as a writer should be, still cannot quite rid himself of the clichés inculcated in him early in life and forming a single, even if incoherent, whole. His formula of American society – economic inequality in the presence of human dignity – may not be impeccable stylistically, but it speaks of the author's keen powers of observation. Almost in the same

breath, though, he complains, almost tearfully: For the life of me I can't understand at times how can this enormous conglomerate hold together despite minimum restrictions and maximum indulgence of inherent human passions and foibles.

Aksyonov's imagery is often strikingly bold, as evidenced, for instance, by his description of American jazz which was for his generation of the Russians a non-stop express train of night wind whooshing past over the top of the iron curtain. He levels well-deserved criticism against his former colleagues who are busy exploiting the "American theme." Addressing those of them who reproach America for its wealth, Aksyonov asks, ironically, whether they think that wealth has just fallen upon the U.S. from heaven instead of being earned by a colossal effort of the nation, by the energy and enterprise of its businessmen, in the process of building an entirely new civilization, a strong but liberal society. Neither does he ignore those who, while continuously reproaching "the U.S. ruling circles" for intrigues against the Soviet Union, have actually done a lot of damage to Soviet-American cooperation.


The author draws comparisons between the two countries throughout the book, but one can hardly expect someone who has decided on changing capitals to be dispassionate. He is not, and his view of things is noticeably distorted as a result. But for all that, the author readily engages in fault-finding self-analysis.

Notably, the author of *Melancholy Baby* has the courage to admit that he cannot integrate himself into a culture which remains essentially alien to him. Later I realized I had been mistaken, and the mistake stemmed from superficial knowledge, from an almost total deafness to the American note, Aksyonov writes referring to his disapproval of the architectural style which predominated in the U.S. at the beginning of the 20th century. After a few years in the States he came to the conclusion that trying to tune in and to catch on amounts to pitiful attempts by a fugitive, thrown out of his world, to build around himself a new life reminiscent, if only just a bit, of the old one...

Alexander Mulyarchik,

D.Sc. (Philology)

PROFILE SKETCHES



Takumi Ueda, a member of parliament for the Japan Socialist Party, is the first politician to have vacated his seat in parliament as a result of the major scandal over Recruit Cosmos shares. Takumi Ueda handed his resignation to the Chairman of the House of Representatives.

Ueda said at a press conference that he personally had nothing to do with Recruit Cosmos but that his former secretary had been involved in the shady affair. Having assumed "political and moral responsibility" for his ex-aide, Ueda has resigned in order not to damage the reputation of his party.

No other Japanese politician is in a hurry to follow Takumi Ueda's example, though the names of some prominent figures in the leading party are being mentioned, among them Noboru Takeshita, Kiichi Miyazawa, Shintaro Abe and Yasuhiro Nakasone. These well-known political figures are suspected of being implicated in reselling Recruit Cosmos shares at huge tax-free profits. The investigation of the affair has in fact just begun.

The people of Osaka have elected Takumi Ueda to parliament five times. He is known as a champion of the rights of the barakumin – a Japanese minority that suffers from discrimination. His resignation gives the Socialists free rein in castigating the leading party during the run-up to the parliamentary elections, which are now likely to take place

next summer. The Socialist leader Takako Doi considers the affair more serious than the Lockheed scandal.

Takumi Ueda is not going to abandon his political career forever, and intends to ask the electorate to nominate him again at the next elections...

* * *

What are the plans of **Lev Vainberg**, chairman of the board of the recently formed Joint International Organizations and U.S.S.R. Amalgamations Association, and simultaneously head of the Soviet-French-Italian joint venture Interquadro?

Joint ventures are facing difficulties that have obliged the heads of such enterprises to come round to the idea of establishing an association to promote the solution of ques-



tions on social and living conditions, provide consultations, help look for trading partners and elaborate proposed improvement in normative acts.

Lev Vainberg, who is now 44, has had an eventful life. His favourite maxim is: "Without risk a man rots." He thinks this maxim has had great influence on his life. At the age of 16, he became helmsman of a motor ship, then worked as a fitter at

a factory and had tried his hand at five trades before he entered the faculty of aviation engineering at Moscow Aviation Institute. Later he did get a second degree, graduating from the faculty of mathematics at Moscow University. In 1973 he became a candidate of technical sciences.

In 1983 at the international exhibition Automation-83, the French company Aniral Uter became interested in a development by the research group Lev Vainberg headed. The partners worked out a number of successful designs in the period between 1984 and 1987, and in December 1987 they produced their brainchild, Interquadro, the first joint venture in the field of computing on the territory of the U.S.S.R. Lev Vainberg has been awarded the 1988 Council of Ministers prize for the developments that laid the foundation of Interquadro.

* * *

The paleographer's hobby

Dmitry Yurasov, 24, a student at the Moscow Institute for Historian-Archivists has since his school days been card-indexing the names of victims of Stalin's terror.

It started when, still in the fifth form, looking through the encyclopaedia, Dima became struck by the fact that many political and public figures had died in the same year, while the explanation that went with it made no sense to him whatever. It read: "Unlawfully subjected to repression under the conditions of the personality cult. Posthumously rehabilitated."

He began his first notebook, in which he entered about 300 names from the encyclopaedia. This is how he started his cross-reference cards, which now has 130,000 cards.

On leaving school, Yurasov became a paleographer at the Central State Archives of the October Revolution continu-



ing to collect material. Having discovered the new worker's "strange" pursuit, the administration moved him out of the special depositions section. But not a day passed without him making up a hundred new cards. When, in November 1982, he was called up for military service, their number had reached 25,000.

In 1985, a year later after his return from the army, Dmitry

was taken onto the staff of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court archive. His file again began to grow rapidly but about a year later, when they discovered what he was doing he was forced to quit. He was also expelled from the Moscow Institute for Historian-Archivists.

Dmitry got a loader's job but did not give up the work that had become his vocation. In April 1987 he spoke publicly for the first time about his hobby at a seminar in the House of Men of Letters...

May 1988 was a turning point. First Sobesec printed a letter from him. Then he made several appearances on Central Television. He was reinstated at the institute and invited to lecture. N magazine did a whole feature on him.

Dmitry Yurasov is now working to establish a paleo archive.

Dmitry Polikar



Audiences are entitled to expect audacity and indictment from the new "Betrayed" director **Constantin Costa-Gavras**, 55. His previous work was exactly distinguished by these qualities. Among them "Z," his film on the military regime in Greece, which opens with the unashamed claim that "any resemblance in the film to persons living or dead is entirely intentional"; "State of Siege," based on actual events, an account of the kidnap of an American diplomat by a left faction in Uruguay; the story of "Missing" was also borrowed from real life and tells the story of a young American who vanished in Chile during the first days of the 1973


coup... The film, which has been shown in Moscow, provoked open resentment on the part of the U.S. State Department and also caused a number lawsuits initiated by among others, former officials at the U.S. embassy in Santiago.

The new picture deals with the problem of racism in the United States. The heroine, an FBI agent, is sent on an intelligence mission to a man suspected of racist conspiracies and murders. She falls in love with him. The aim of the film, says Costa-Gavras, is to show how seemingly nice and decent people become infected with racism.

The director denies that the episodes shown in the film "Betrayed" are improbable. Take, for example, the episode of "the hunt" when the armed whites who have kidnapped the black give him a gun and offer to let him get away... At the same time Costa-Gavras points out that "Betrayed" is not a documentary and that its appeal is not just to Americans, as racism is a phenomenon that exists in one form or another in many countries.

Costa-Gavras is a French

citizen of Greek origin and lives in Paris. His real name is Kostantinos Gavras and Costas was his childhood pet name. Once in a film billing his name appeared with a hyphen instead of the letter "s," Costa-Gavras. It was too late to make any corrections, the director recalls. And he has borne this double-barrelled name ever since...



Sergei Lisovsky was unseen by the spectators who came to watch the first Soviet musical in Luzhniki. All the applause went to the performers - Sergei Minayev, Vladimir Presnyakov... Yet among the artists who took part in the production of "The Street" there was hardly any-

one more indispensable than Sergei Lisovsky, the leader of the popular music studio Moskva.

Sergei took a degree in Radio Physics Engineering at the Moscow Energy Institute. After graduation he worked for five years on a Moscow District Komsomol committee.

The ideal evening for young people seemed to us to be a show in the spirit and traditions of a student skit - a jolly jamboree with all sorts of jokes - but in form of a discotheque with a blurred line of demarcation between the floor and the stage, where each spectator can become, as he does, a member of the cast, Sergei says. "We tried out our idea in a student camp belonging to the Moscow Energy Institute near Alushta in the Crimea. Then, having gained some experience, we produced our programme for the first time in the Moscow youth cinema the Novorossiysk. We did the rounds of various palaces of culture for some years."

In November 1986, at the first festival of Moscow amateur theatres in Lefortovo, we showed "Let's Talk about Young People," which embodied the artistic concept of the studio's members in its mature form. The performance consisted of eight songs, each of which, an illustration as it were of young people's life (tourism, carnival, spivs...), was adapted for the stage, that is, done like a videoclip.


In January 1988 the Moskva studio was offered the largest indoor auditorium in the Soviet Union - the Olimpiyskiy sports complex - where they performed for a week with up to 20,000 people attending each of their concerts.

Leaning increasingly towards dramatized performances, the Moskva studio had the idea of producing a musical. Its opening show took place this November in Luzhniki. The authors are Vladimir Presnyakov, Boris Sautkin and Mikhail Tikhomirov. It is the story of an ordinary Moscow street and, of course, a love story...

Architect turned rock star

Though he trained as an architect, **Vyacheslav Butusov**, 27, prefers the guitar and microphone to the pen and his trade. He is now best known with the well-known group Nautilus Pomorskiy. It has become accepted for the best informal and music programmes on Central Television to include the oddly-named group from Sverdlovsk, but with the same songs though. Nautilus has won first prizes at lots of festivals, along with more admiration, which is not necessarily come from its traditional fans.

Nautilus's success rests on the bedrock principles, by the vivid acting and skills of Vyacheslav



Butusov, the romantic aura of his songs, and, something that makes the group unique among all other social rock performers, the fact that what they sing is the real thing. This is expressed both in their music, slow for rock, and the way they perform it.

Variety performers have destroyed the reputation of song as a genre in the eyes of the young - with exaggerated cheerfulness, saccharine sentimentality and primitive didactic pop. Nautilus is creating a new style of song for the young.

Nautilus's texts written by Ilya Kormiltsev and Butusov himself, can be ascribed to the genre of romantic realism. They cover a wide range of subjects - from the life of a working-class girl ("A glance from the screen") to an accurate characterization of the stagnation mentality ("Chained").

Yuri Shevtsov

Close-up on Wajda

The prominent film director talks to Soviet students

Andrzej Wajda has been to the Soviet Union to show his films "Man of Marble," "Man of Iron," "Danton," "Landscape after Battle," "Pilate," "The Promised Land" and "Without Anaesthetic." One of his first meetings in this country was at Moscow University.

Did you bring all the films you wanted to bring?

I have been waiting for this meeting with Soviet audiences for eight years and I did my best. My German producer even sent me a copy of "Pilate" from West Berlin, a film made 17 years ago. It has never been shown since. But, still, there are two films I have not brought. "The Possessed," based on Dostoyevsky's novel, is one of them. I made it in France and I didn't bring it because I felt that it should be shown first to the "in" crowd, that is to say, I would have to have the esoteric opinion of it first. The other film is "Love in Germany," and I did not bring it because it is not quite ready yet. But, really, we must have something left for next time...

You are widely believed to be a student of the classic director Luis Buñuel. Your message of greeting to Ingmar Bergman was included in a jubilee edition of a Swedish film magazine dedicated to Bergman's 70th birthday. Do you consider yourself a student of Bergman as well?

I began my career at a wonderful period in the history of the art of motion pictures. Buñuel had just appeared on the scene. At first he worked in Mexico and then he started making films in France. I saw his silent films "An Andalusian Dog" and "L'Age d'Or" when I was still at the Film Academy. When my own film "Canal" was shown in Cannes, journalists asked me who my godfather in the cinema was, and I replied Buñuel, although I had only seen two of his films. Later on I saw his other films, and they said a great deal to me. Buñuel wrote a brief foreword to a collection of my interviews. The book was never published, but it always warms my heart to reread what he wrote about me.

In later years Bergman made a number

of magnificent films, Kurosawa's films were screened in Europe, and Fellini became famous. I consider all of them my mentors.

When the Swedish magazine asked me to write a tribute to Bergman, I wrote that throughout my own career I have envied him because he has never had to make political films. He lives in a country where politics as we understand it do not exist. He has never had to travel anywhere to make his films, he could just stay home and make them. He could make films about women, one of the most important themes in all civilized countries. I also wrote in my tribute that Bergman could afford to make a film about a man and a woman, while I had to make a "soldier meets girl" film.

Where do you reside at present?


I have always lived in Poland. I have never made my home abroad. I made two movies abroad recently, though. I resolved to make them a long time ago and would have made them anyway, regardless of the situation in Poland. The first film, "Danton," was made in France, although it is based on a play by the Polish writer Stanisława Przybyszewska. I used some Polish actors, and the artistic director and costume designer is also a Pole. The second film I made abroad is "Love in Germany." From time to time I stage plays abroad. I do that for two reasons: either I need actors who live in another country, or a future film requires this. But I live in Warsaw.

What is your attitude to religion?

I am a Catholic, but it would be difficult for me to explain this to you. Please don't try and draw me on this; it is a very personal matter. Anyway I would have to tell you all about the part the Church plays in Poland and its influence, and this would take a lot of time.

Could you tell us more about "Man of Marble" and "Man of Iron"?

The screenplay for "Man of Marble" was written in 1962, but I only got round



to making it 12 years later. The 20th CPSU Congress had taken place and seemed to have put paid to Stalin. But nevertheless the sequences in the film which was set in the 1950s, seemed to be shocking on the screen. That's why I started making the film when the situation at home had changed and those who were members of Komsomol in the 1950s were coming to power. They wanted to recall their youth and they hoped to see it in my film. I remember those years very clearly. At the time I was a student at the Academy of Fine Arts, and then I went to the Film Academy. I helped my senior colleagues make propaganda films.

It was not an easy film to make. In the final part, for instance, I had some problems. The screenplay ends with the protagonist going to night school, but 10 years had passed, and he was obviously too old for that. I began to think about what could have happened to a man like him. Before that the events on the Baltic Coast had culminated in an explosion that overwhelmed us all. I thought that that of course my hero was one of the workers killed at Gdansk. I could not even have begun to dream, of course, of making that sequence; it was hard enough to make a film about the 1950s. But I could travel to the coast and it occurred to me that Polish audiences would understand if the son of the protagonist never told his girl friend what happened to his father. It would appear only natural that he would not tell her about that, as people were scared by the developments that were underway.

When I was making "Man of Marble" I never imagined that I would one day co-

...continue that theme. Then the year 1980 burst into our lives. I went to a shipyard and one of the workers suggested to me that I make the film "Man of Iron." I began to work on it in February 1981, and in April the film was shown in Cannes. In July it was screened in Poland and one in ten Poles, three million people, saw it.

Your films speak eloquently of your own stand, but what is your assessment of the events of 1981 and the activities of the opposition today? Aren't there some contradictions in your outlook? You won a prize at the World Youth and Student Festival in Moscow for an anti-fascist film. After you won the Palme d'Or award in Cannes, Le Figaro commented that "Man of Iron" is the gravest charge ever brought against the Soviets...

I cannot be held responsible for what the newspapers say. The important thing is why I make such films.

If we assume that a film reflects reality, I only bear part of the responsibility for the latter. That reality was made possible by the actual political situation in the country. We want more democracy and re-

spect for the rights of the individual.

It is quite clear that if a nation that came into being a thousand years ago, a nation of 37 million that has its own resources of coal, steel and oil and a developed agriculture, a nation that has a large number of educated people, goes through an economic crisis every few years, the change must be profound. Our society is sitting on the fence now. It wants to have guarantees that the process of change on which it must embark does not stop or start to go into reverse.

Interviewer:

Susanna Alperina

Photos by A. Galeyev



Stills from the films "Ashes and Diamonds" and "Canal"

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Debut in Seoul

Soviet athletes make their debut at the Wheelchair Olympics

The 1988 Seoul Paralympics was the official name of the Olympic Games for disabled people held in Seoul in October which provided a sequel to the 24th Games of the 1988 Olympiad. Sixty-two countries sent their athletes there. For the first time — these were the eighth such Games — the Soviet Union was also represented. Its team of 22 included swimmers and track-and-field athletes (by comparison, the U.S. team numbered about 300 participants). All the more impressive is the Soviet team's result — it came twelfth, winning 21 gold, 20 silver and 15 bronze medals. Vadim Kalmykov alone collected four golds.

"Why hadn't our country taken part in these events before?" I asked Natalia Sladkova, Secretary of the U.S.S.R. Federation of Physical Culture for Disabled People.

"There are several reasons. First, we were not members of several international organizations which is mandatory if you want to take part in the Games. Secondly, we didn't have the necessary equipment and special aids, such as artificial limbs, without which it was impossible to take part in these competitions. We are still short of these aids."

"Disabled people have neither a stadium, a swimming pool, nor a gymnasium for practice," says Mikhail Lachev, a track-and-field athlete who took part in the Paralympic Games. "Coaches are not interested in working with us because it's a taxing job, and they aren't paid anything extra for it."


Speaking of money, in Seoul, where our delegation received a very warm and cordial welcome, the crowds were as big as at the 1988 Olympics. But at the Olympics every Soviet athlete who

won received 10,000 rubles and 2,000 dollars. Paraplegics, while attracting an equal number of spectators, were only paid 120 dollars per diem for their two weeks in Seoul. I was told at the State Sport Committee that the money paid to our "main" Olympic athletes was designed to encourage performance. But doesn't a disabled athlete deserve encouragement? In Lithuania, this is already being done. A disabled athlete who wins a gold in an international competition draws a monthly stipend of 80 rubles over the following two years.

"The State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport doesn't take much interest in us. We don't add to the prestige of our colours," says Victor Chernyayev, one of the paralympic team's coaches. "Even equipping our team is a near-insoluble problem. It took a lot of effort to provide our team with decent costumes. At one point I felt like quitting. I said to my team: 'Enough begging and cajoling. We'll go in our track suits and pose for pictures.' In the end things came right, but at what a cost in nerves!"


"Have you seen blind people run? Imagine a track with people posted every 50 metres giving vocal signals to guide blind runners... Among the competitors at the paralympics in Seoul were one-handed hammer throwers and basketballers who had never walked... Soviet paraplegics didn't take part in the team games, as they had no specialized wheelchairs, nor did they take part in the handball competitions for the blind. We have no special balls that make a noise.

"The physical training programme in schools for the blind children leaves much to be desired. It is believed that sport might be harmful for the partially sighted. But our approach to such people should be differentiated. Every patient is an individual case that should be judged on its own merits. Sport for a disabled person is not just a way of improving physical fitness, but the main and sometimes the only chance to restore self-confidence."




Cho Hyun Hee, a Games participant, holds the Olympic torch. She is helped by her daughter
AP-TASS photo

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